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ABSTRACT 
This research analyses the statistical relationship between income distribution and seven 
taxation and government expenditure components in Namibia using data from 1996-2016. 
The research is aimed at creating new knowledge on the research topic because no 
literature exists for Namibia. The Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) cointegration 
technique was employed to assess the long-run relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables in Eviews. The research findings indicated that there is no long-run 
relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables. In the short-run, 
the research findings indicate that government expenditure on social pensions and 
government expenditure on education have a balancing effect on income distribution, 
while tax on products, corporate income tax and customs and excise duties have an 
unbalancing and/or worsening effect on income distribution. Based on these findings, 
tertiary education loans are recommended as opposed to grants to ensure sustainability of 
Namibia Students Financial Assistance Fund (NASFAF). In adjusting corporate and value 
added taxes, the government is cautioned to avoid overburdening consumers and 
employees through tax shifting in the form of high prices of goods and services and low 
wages and benefits. A tax mix, tax discrimination and a hybrid of taxation and 
government expenditure components are strongly recommended to achieve a balance.  
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DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS 
Customs duties – These are charges that are payable when goods first enter the economic 
territory of any Southern African Customs (SACU) Union Member State from outside the 
SACU. 
Excise duties – Refers to the charges that are collected on specified goods that are 
produced and consumed in a specific country or economic bloc, e.g. SACU. 
Gini coefficient: This is an internationally accepted measure of income distribution, 
which expresses the income distribution of a country into a single number ranging 
between 0 and 1. A higher number represents high levels of income inequality and vice 
versa.  
Government expenditure – Refers to the purchasing of goods and services by the 
government. This is inclusive of all government operations such as the provision of public 
goods and transfer payments.  
Income distribution – This refers to the way in which the national income of a country is 
distributed among its citizens. 
Income inequality – The extent to which the national income of a country is unequally 
distributed among its citizens.  
Social pensions – In the Namibian context, Social Pensions refers to the universal and 
unrestricted transfer of money to persons who are 60 years and older with the objective of 
improving the social welfare of the recipients. Social pensions in Namibia are extended to 
other vulnerable members of the society, e.g. people with mental and/or physical 
disabilities. 
Taxation – The method in which governments raise funds by charging their citizens and 
corporate bodies to finance government expenditure. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
 
 Introduction   
Income inequality is a global issue that has been at the centre of discussion over the 
past decades. Inequality has been receiving attention at both national and international 
level. Goal 10 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is aimed 
at reducing income inequality within and among countries. At country level, national 
objectives such as Namibia’s Vision 2030 and National Development Plans (NDPs) 
all prioritise the reduction of income inequality. Namibia’s Vision 2030 has eight 
themes, the first of which is Inequality and Social Welfare (Office of the President, 
2004). Increasing income equality was one of the three objectives of the fourth 
National Development Plan (National Planning Commission, 2012). Governments use 
taxation and expenditure for redistribution and revenue collection purposes, among 
others. Taxation is a way in which governments raise funds by imposing charges on 
citizens and corporate entities to finance their expenditures. Governments need funds 
from taxation to finance expenditures such as national defence, transport 
infrastructures, healthcare, education, ports and telecommunication services, among 
others. In economics, these goods are referred to as public goods. Apart from the 
provision of public goods, governments need funds to correct market failures such as 
negative externalities (e.g. pollution), information asymmetry and income inequality, 
among others. 
 
This research analysed the impact of taxation and government expenditure 
components on income distribution in Namibia for a period of 21 years. Leu, Frey & 
Buhmann (2009) carried out a research to analyse the impact of government policies 
on income distribution in Switzeland using the Budget incidence approach. In 
conducting their investigation, Leu, et al., (2009) used data from the first nationwide 
representative Income and Wealth Survey. The findings of their research indicate that 
government expenditures are more effective in redistributing national income as 
opposed to direct taxes. Social welfare expenditures were found to be more effective 
in redistributing national income as opposed to other government expenditures. Their 
research further indicate that indirect taxes have an unbalancing effect on the 
distribution of income. It is very important to conduct a similar research for Namibia 
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with some modifications to statistically analyse the relationship between income 
inequality and a selected number of taxation and government expenditure components 
in the country. Namibia is at the centre of discussion for this research because it is one 
of the countries with the highest income inequality levels in Southern Africa as per 
the World Bank categorisation of income inequality. The Gini coefficient is used as a 
measure of income inequality in this research because it is an internationally accepted 
measure of income inequality which is comparable across countries, and data for this 
variable is readily available. The findings of this research seek to create or expand 
knowledge pertaining to the effects of taxation and government expenditure 
components on income distribution in Namibia. Income in Namibia is unequally 
distributed with a Gini coefficient measure of 56 (Bank of Namibia Annual Report, 
2015). The National Housing Income and Expenditure Survey (NHIES) of 2004 
revealed that the richest fifth of the population accounted for 78.7 percent of the total 
national income, while the poorest fifth of the population survived on a meagre 1.4 
percent of the total income (National Planning Commission, 2004). This is a clear 
indication that the resources of the country are in the hands of very few individuals, 
while the majority of the Namibian population dwell in abject poverty. Income 
inequality is a common phenomenon in most African countries, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa. It is worth noting that Africa has the highest level of income 
inequality among all continents with an average Gini coefficient of 43. The average 
Gini coefficient of other developing countries is 39 (African Development Bank 
Group, 2017). Namibia is a member of the SADC, which is an economic bloc 
consisting of 15 member states, including Zambia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Botswana, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), United Republic of Tanzania, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Mauritius, South Africa (SA), Seychelles and 
Swaziland. Key objectives of the SADC are to fast-track economic growth and 
development, reduce poverty and improve the living standard of its inhabitants. The 
economic bloc also aspires to strengthen political and institutional co-operation and 
safeguard peace and security in the region. It is worth noting that member countries 
deal with taxation and expenditure policies individually. Namibia is also a member of 
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) as well as the Common Monetary Area 
(CMA). Key objectives of the SACU are to smoothen cross-border trading between 
the member states. The bloc aims to promote an equitable and fair distribution of the 
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revenue arising from customs and excise duties levied by SACU member states using 
the SACU revenue sharing formula. Customs and Excise (CE) duty from the SACU is 
one of the explanatory variables for this research. The Gini coefficient for Namibia is 
considered very high as per the inequality categorisation of the World Bank below:  
 
Table 1.1: Categories of income inequality 
INCOME INEQUALITY CATEGORY GINI COEFFICIENT VALUE/RANGE  
Low income inequality 20-29.9 
Medium income inequality 30-39.9 
High income inequality 40-49.9 
Very high income inequality ≥ 50 
Source: World Bank (2018)  
 
Several studies show that world income is unevenly distributed and this inequality in 
income distribution is evident within countries, between countries and between 
continents.  Kuznets (1980) indicates that the three underdeveloped regions of the 
world (Latin America, Africa and Asia) account for 66.5 percent of the world’s 
population but account for only 23.8 percent of the world’s income. Table 2 below 
shows a comparison of income inequality and human development status of Namibia 
to its neighbouring countries:   
 
Table 1.2: Income inequality and Human Development Index (HDI)  
Country Income inequality 
category 
Average Gini 
coefficient (2005-
2015) 
HDI Category HDI (2015) 
Namibia Very high income 
inequality 
61.3 Medium Human 
Development  
0.628 
South Africa Very high income 
inequality 
65.0 Medium Human 
Development 
0.666 
Botswana Very high income 
inequality 
60.5 Medium Human 
development 
0.698 
Angola High income 
inequality 
42.7 Low Human 
Development 
0.532 
Lesotho Very high income 
inequality 
54.2 Low Human 
Development 
0.497 
Source: United Nations Human Development Report (2016) 
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The Namibian economy has grown steadily during the past years with an average real 
GDP growth rate of 4.6 percent and an average GDP per capita growth rate of 9 
percent over the past eight years (2008 - 2015). Despite this steady growth realized 
over the past eight years, the gap between the poor and the rich as measured by the 
Gini coefficient remained very high as shown in Figure 1.3 below.  Figure 1.1 below 
depicts the growth trajectory of the real GDP and GDP per capita in actual values 
while Figure 1.2 presents the growth rate of real GDP and GDP per capita in 
percentage points.   
 
Figure 1.1: Growth trajectory of the real GDP and GDP per capita in actual values 
 
Source: Author’s compilation using data from National Accounts 
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Figure 1.2: Real GDP and GDP per capita percentage growth rates  
 
Source: Author’s compilation using data from National Accounts 
 
Based on the figures above, Namibia was ranked in the upper-middle income 
category, a situation that has lowered donor funding, which has shrunk since the 
announcement of the ranking. Income inequality in Namibia has been decreasing 
since 1990 but at a snail’s pace. The graph below depicts the Gini coefficient trend for 
Namibia from 1993 to 2018.  
 
Figure 1.3: Gini coefficient trend for Namibia 
 
Source:  Author’s depiction using data from Namibia Statistics Agency  
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It is worth noting that the Gini coefficient figure for Namibia decreased between 1993 
and 2017. However, the rate at which it is decreasing is a point of concern which 
requires prudent interventions. It can be clearly observed from Figures 1.1, 1.2 and 
1.3 above that GDP and GDP per capita have been increasing gradually over the past 
few years, but that the Gini coefficient remains at an unacceptable level.  
  
Taxation policies and regulations in Namibia are guided by the Income Tax Act and 
the Sales Tax Act, while social security matters fall under the Social Security Act of 
1994. In terms of taxation policies, there are different forms of taxes, which can be 
categorised into five groups namely direct, indirect, regressive, progressive and 
proportional in nature. The variables considered for this dissertation are government 
expenditure on social pensions, government expenditure on education, government 
expenditure on health, customs and excise duty from SACU, tax on income and 
wealth, tax on products and tax on corporations. The naming of the variables in this 
dissertation is adjusted based on how they appear in the national accounts, which is 
the main source of data for this dissertation. To be specific, VAT is referred to as tax 
on products, corporate tax is referred to as tax on corporations while personal income 
tax is included in the category of tax on income and wealth in the national accounts.  
 
 Statement of the problem  
This dissertation analyses the impact of taxation and government expenditure 
components on income distribution in Namibia in order to fill the gap in the literature 
because no literature exists for Namibia on this specific topic. Namibia has one of the 
highest income inequalities in the world with a Gini coefficient measure of 56 as of 
2015. According to the World Bank categorisation of income inequality, Namibia is 
in the category of “very high income inequality” (see table 1.1 and 1.2 above). Given 
the gap in the literature and evidence of high income inequality, a need for an 
empirical study was identified in order to come up with research-based solutions and 
policy recommendations to address unequal distribution of income and the gap in the 
literature.   
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 Research objective  
The general objective of this dissertation is to analyse and interpret the impact of 
taxation and government expenditure components on income distribution in Namibia. 
Specific objectives of the study are:  
a) To identify the gap in the literature by reviewing theoretical and empirical 
literature.  
b) To apply statistical tools to test the joint significance of the selected variables 
c) To identify which independent variables have a balancing/positive effect and 
which variables have a negative effect on the Gini coefficient.  
 
 Research questions  
This dissertation seeks to get answers to the following research questions: 
a) Are corporate income tax, customs and excise duty from SACU (SACU receipts), 
tax on income and wealth, tax on products, government expenditure on social 
pensions, government expenditure on health and government expenditure on 
education jointly significant determinants of the Gini coefficient?  
b) Does corporate income tax, customs and excise duty (SACU receipts) and tax on 
products have an unbalancing effect on the Gini coefficient? 
c) Does government expenditure on social pensions, government expenditure on 
education, government expenditure on health and tax on income and wealth have 
a positive or balancing effect on the Gini coefficient?  
From the research questions above, we can derive the corresponding null and 
alternative hypotheses of the dissertation for each question. The hypotheses of the 
dissertation are:  
a) Corporate income tax, customs and excise duty from SACU (SACU receipts), tax 
on income and wealth, tax on products, government expenditure on social 
pensions, government expenditure on health, and government expenditure on 
education are jointly significant determinants of the Gini coefficient.   
b) Corporate income tax, customs and excise duty (SACU receipts) and tax on 
products have an unbalancing or worsening effect on the Gini coefficient.  
c) Government expenditure on social pensions, government expenditure on 
education, government expenditure on health, and tax on income and wealth have 
a positive or balancing effect on the Gini coefficient.   
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 Significance of the research  
This topic is of interest to the researcher because it can contribute extensively towards 
finding a lasting solution to the skewed distribution of income in Namibia, which has 
one of the highest income inequalities in Southern Africa, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient. The researcher wishes to encourage other researchers and scholars to 
conduct further studies by building on this research. Protest movements such as the 
Affirmative Repositioning and the Landless People’s Movement in Namibia all came 
about because of unequal distribution of income and wealth in the country. In 
summary, this research is significant in that: 
a) It can be used as a guiding tool for policy making both in the private and public 
sector; 
b) It can create new knowledge and understanding about the research topic; 
c) It can be used as an instrument for further research; 
d) It can provide additional research material for students who are studying research-
related topics/subjects. 
 
 Expected contribution of the research  
This research is a first attempt to analyse the impact of taxation and government 
expenditure components on income distribution in Namibia. It can thus contribute 
significantly to the field of economics and to the economy in various ways as 
summarised below: There is a gap in the literature because to the best of my 
knowledge, no literature exists on the impact of taxation and government expenditure 
components on income distribution in Namibia. Therefore, this study attempts to fill 
this gap and create new knowledge in this area. This research is also inclusive because 
it covers many taxation and expenditure variables compared most previous papers, 
thus creating new knowledge in diverse aspects. Considering the similarity in the 
economic structures of SADC member states, other SADC countries can use this 
research as a benchmark for further enquiry into the impact of taxation and 
government expenditure components on income distribution. Research material on the 
SADC region is scanty and additions are of immense value.  
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 Outline of the research  
The rest of this research is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides an outline of 
taxation and income inequality on a global perspective, taxation and government 
expenditure in Namibia as well as the status of income distribution in the country. 
Chapter 3 presents the review of theoretical and empirical literature pertaining to the 
research topic. It highlights the findings of various researchers on the topic, and 
covers the methodologies used in empirical literatures. The chapter also looks at 
conflicting and contradicting literature as well as conformity to general theories. 
Chapter 5 presents econometric data analysis and empirical findings of the research 
using the estimation model and techniques. The chapter provides an interpretation of 
the empirical relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables. 
Chapter 6 presents a summary of the findings of this research. It consists of the 
summary of the empirical research findings, policy recommendations and limitations 
of the research. 
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CHAPTER 2: INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND POLICIES FOR REDRESS IN 
NAMIBIA  
 
 Introduction  
This chapter presents an outline of taxation and government expenditure in Namibia 
as well as the current state of income distribution in Namibia. It covers four main 
discussions, namely, the pillars of national development planning, taxation in 
Namibia, an overview of government expenditure in Namibia, and the state of the 
distribution of income in Namibia, followed by a brief conclusion of the chapter.  
Before proceeding, the global perspective is painted.  
 
 Income inequality and taxation on a global perspective  
2.2.1 Income inequality in the world  
Income inequality is a global challenge that affects all countries in the world. 
However, the degree of inequality differs from country to country and continent to 
continent. Various researchers and scholars indicate that the world income is 
unequally distributed and that this inequality occurs within countries, between 
countries and between continents.  Kuznets (1980) indicates that the three 
underdeveloped continents of the world, namely Latin America, Africa and Asia, 
account for more than 60 percent of the world’s population but account for less than 
30 percent of the world’s income. Table 2.1 below depicts the distribution of income 
according to different household quantiles. 
 
Table 2.1: Income distribution of selected countries 
Households 
(quantile) 
Percentage of total income 
Brazil and South Africa United States Finland and Sweden  
Lowest 2 5 8 
Second 5 11 14 
Third 10 16 20 
Fourth 18 24 23 
Highest  65 44 35 
Source: Parkin (2016) 
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According to the African Development Bank Group (2017), Africa has the highest 
income inequality in the world with an average Gini index value of 43, while Europe 
has the lowest income inequality. At country level, South Africa, Colombia, Namibia, 
Botswana, Brazil, Honduras and Chile are among countries with the highest income 
inequalities in the world, with an average Gini index value above 50. Countries with 
the Gini index value of 30 and above but less than 50 are considered as medium Gini 
coefficient countries. These countries include Russia, Vietnam, Argentina, Mexico, 
Uruguay, Poland and the United States. Countries with a Gini coefficient below 30 
are considered as low Gini index countries, and these countries include Norway, 
Denmark, Austria, Slovenia, Germany, Sweden and Ukraine, among others. The 
causes of income inequalities differ from continent to continent and country to 
country. The next section highlights the causes of income inequality and the strategies 
that can be implemented to mitigate the effect of income inequality.  
 
2.2.2  Causes of income inequality 
Income inequality can be attributed to a number of factors, which differ from country 
to country and continent to continent. Below are seven factors that are attributed to 
income inequality in the United States of America (USA). These are ability, education 
and training, discrimination, preferences and risks, unequal distribution of wealth, 
market power and luck, and connections and misfortunes (McConnell and Brue, 
2002). These factors are based on the explanations below: 
 
a) Ability - People have different mental, physical and aesthetic talents and abilities 
that can enable them to earn high salaries over time. Some people have very weak 
mental and physical abilities that consequently deprive them of highly paid 
professions. This condition is hereditary and as a result, people of a specific 
bloodline are likely to remain poor because they can only secure low paying jobs 
based on their mental and physical abilities.  
b) Education and Training - Education and training can generate continuous 
income for people over time. The more educated the individual is, the more future 
income the individual can receive, thereby reducing income inequality. Firms 
should be encouraged to offer bursaries and scholarships to their workers as well 
as to deserving students from low-income households to acquire those rare skills. 
12 
 
There is also a need to prioritise some fields of study which are deemed very 
critical in terms of skills shortage to increase the country’s productivity in the 
future and consequently reduce poverty and income inequality. This should be 
done with caution to ensure the inclusion of low income earners and poor 
members of society.  
 
In the modern world, most industries are very sophisticated and require highly 
skilled labour because of the nature of their operations. These industries include 
the health sector (surgeons to be specific) and the aircraft industry.  To ensure that 
there are enough rare skilled workers such as doctors and engineers, nations must 
ensure that high school graduates from poor families/poor townships are well 
equipped with the necessary skills to pursue specialised professions with a view to 
reducing income inequality. Firms should also be encouraged to offer bursaries 
and scholarships to poor citizens as part of their corporate social responsibility to 
enable deserving students from low-income households to acquire specialised 
skills. 
c) Discrimination - McConnell and Brue (2002) identify discrimination as a source 
of income inequality in the USA. This occurs because of biased selection in 
education, hiring, training and promotion that as a result contributes to high 
income inequality. Discrimination in the USA is based on race and gender, and as 
a result, racial and ethnic minorities are restricted to low-paying jobs because the 
labour supply is artificially modified to favour men and the majority race in the 
USA, thereby increasing income inequality along racial and gender lines.  
d) Preferences and Risks - It is believed that consumer preferences and risks are 
among the major causes of income inequality in the USA. Individuals who prefer 
to stay home or work fewer hours to take care of their families often find 
themselves in the low-income group and, at times, they find it difficult to meet 
basic needs, thereby increasing income inequality.  
e) Unequal distribution of wealth - Unequal distribution of wealth is associated 
with income inequality everywhere in the world. People with wealth in the form 
of machinery, real estate, farmland, stocks and bonds and savings accounts tend to 
receive more income from their wealth compared to those with no wealth at all. 
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New graduates may have a good salary but it takes several years to accumulate 
assets.  
f) Market power - Manipulation of the market system for own benefit can increase 
income inequality because it restricts the participation of other market 
participants. This is done in some professions whereby new entrants are required 
to obtain operational licences, but the entry criteria are in the hands of 
competitors, who can easily control the number of new entrants or competitors 
into the market.  
g)  Luck, Connections and Misfortunes - Income inequality can be a result of luck, 
connections and misfortune. Discovering gold/oil/diamonds on a farm or owning 
land along a proposed freeway has resulted in substantially high income for 
individuals. Good industry connections and political connections are other 
personal and professional connections can lead to extremely high incomes. On the 
other hand, misfortunes such as fatal illnesses, fatal accidents and the death of a 
breadwinner in the family and loss of income/employment may result in extreme 
inequalities.  
Even though the abovementioned causes of income inequality were identified 
specifically for the United States, most of them are applicable to other countries’ 
situations. The next section provides mitigation measures to deal with the challenges 
of income inequalities.  
  
2.2.3   Policies and strategies to reduce income inequality 
According to Nafziger (2006), the following policies should be put in place to deal 
with the problem of unequal distribution of income. 
a) Population Programmes 
Individuals in the low income group tend to have fewer children in order to reduce the 
financial burden on the parents, such as medical, educational and food costs. Low-
income earners should be encouraged to reduce the sizes of their families through 
family planning. 
b) Health and Nutrition 
Least Developed Countries increase equity by shifting funds from advanced curative 
medicines in urban areas to hospitals and health services in rural areas. The demand 
for health care of low-income earners is highly price-elastic and when the fees are 
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higher than nominal, the poor are the first to drop out. This problem can be solved by 
charging the rich high fees to subsidise health care for the poor. Poor health and 
insufficient food reduce employment opportunities and the earning power of low-
income earners. Therefore, food subsidies or free rations increase the income of the 
poor, thereby improving their health and consequently permitting them to work many 
days per year. An unhealthy employee represents a double loss to the employer 
because of lost production due to sick leave, and the employer still has to pay the 
employee who is on sick leave.  
c) Education and Training  
Education and training are the major factors that can reduce the problem of income 
inequality in any country. Gaining skills through education as well as through other 
forms of human capital yields a stream of income over time. Therefore, low-income 
earners should be given the privilege to attain free primary, secondary and tertiary 
education. This can help the country to achieve equality in income distribution. Given 
the fast changing nature of technology, industries and employers prefer educated as 
opposed to uneducated workers. It is worth noting that uneducated and educated 
workers are considered as imperfectly substitutable inputs to the production process. 
This is true in most industries, especially in the medical, financial and IT industries. 
In a heart operation, 10 nurses with a midwife and nursing certificate cannot replace 
one cardiologist. From this viewpoint, it is evident that different production processes 
are demanding more of educated labour as compared to uneducated labour, and 
educated labour cannot be substituted by uneducated labour regardless of the quantity 
of uneducated labour. In the modern world, most industries are very sophisticated and 
require highly skilled labour because of the nature of their operations. These 
industries are such as the health sector (surgeons to be specific) and the aircraft 
industry (Meier and Rauch, 2005). It is therefore advisable that low income earners be 
encouraged to obtain some sort of education and/or ensure that their children obtain 
the best education they can afford to ensure a steady future income and avoid 
generational poverty.  
d) Research and Technology 
The benefit of research and modern technology in reducing income inequality is most 
apparent in agriculture. The introduction of high-yielding wheat and rice, “the green 
revolution”, has expanded food supply and reduced food prices for the poor. It is 
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worth noting that the strategies identified by Nafziger (2006) above are in line with 
the existing economic theories.  
 
The implementation of remedial measures highlighted by Nafziger (2006) above 
would require government expenditure, and the main source of government funds is 
taxation. This shows the crucial role of taxation and government expenditure 
components in the redistribution of income.  
 
2.2.4   Measures of income inequality 
Hayami (1998) identifies three ways of measuring income inequality. The first 
method is the simplest one and is measured by taking the percentage of total income 
accruing to households belonging to the high-income or low-income class (such as the 
bottom 20 percent of households). The higher the share of the high-income class and 
the lower the share of the low-income class, the greater the inequality, and vice versa. 
The second measure is by taking the ratio of the income share of the top group to that 
of the bottom group, which equals the ratio of the average income in the highest 
income group to that of the low-income group. The third measure is the Gini 
coefficient, which is derived from the Lorenz curve. The Gini coefficient was 
developed by an Italian statistician and sociologist, Carrado Gini, and published in his 
1912 paper titled “Variability and Mutability”. The Gini index value lies between zero 
and one (1 < Gini coefficient<0). A large Gini coefficient figure indicates a high level 
of inequality and a low Gini coefficient figure is associated with low income 
inequality. The first two measures of income inequality are simple to calculate and 
easy to understand, but they are subject to constraints such as biased use of 
information pertaining only to the top and the bottom group and randomness in the 
differentiation of the income classes. The Gini coefficient is used instead, to avoid the 
above-mentioned shortcomings. Income inequality could also be measured from the 
expenditure side and not only from the income side. When income inequality is 
measured from the expenditure side excluding tax payments, the Gini coefficient 
tends to be lower than when tax payments are included (Fourie and Burger, 2013).  
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2.2.5   The rationale for paying tax 
2.2.5.1   Why should we pay tax?   
While many people regard paying tax as a form of legalised theft, Munday (1996) 
provides three main reasons why taxation should remain an integral part of the 
national economic system. The first function of taxation is to redistribute income from 
those who have more to those who have less. The second function of taxation is to 
correct market failures. These market failures include lack or limited provision of 
public goods, lack of perfect information/asymmetric information, monopolies that 
exist within the free market economy and negative externalities. Public goods and 
services include all goods and services that cannot be provided efficiently and 
profitably by the private sector, such as national defence, police services, public road 
infrastructures and telecommunication services.  Negative externalities include 
pollution by firms as well as the need to regulate the fishing, mining and forestry 
sectors to avoid over-exploitation of these natural resources. This can be corrected by 
creating an ownership structure and legally establishing charges for the use of these 
natural resources. The third function of taxation is to raise revenue for the 
government. We can add the fourth function of taxation within the macroeconomic 
policy, which is to regulate the level of aggregate demand in the economy by cutting 
or raising tax, depending on the state of the economy. Based on the critical points 
above, we confidently conclude that taxation should remain an integral part of the 
economic system because of its crucial role in the national economy.  
 
2.2.5.2 What makes a ‘good’ tax 
The tax system should be extremely significant and avoid wastage. Munday (1996) 
identifies three criteria for a good tax. Firstly, the tax must be fair. Secondly, the tax 
must minimise the administrative cost involved in collecting tax, and lastly, it must 
minimise the disincentive effects of taxes. Munday’s criteria are in line with the four 
‘canons’ of a good tax stipulated by Smith (1776), which include:  
Economy - All taxes should be inexpensive to collect and should not discourage 
desirable business; 
Convenience - All taxes must be collected in a way that is convenient to the taxpayer; 
Certainty - All taxes must be clear and easy to understand; and 
Equity - All taxes must be fair in all essence.  
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 Income distribution in Namibia since 1990 
When the first democratically elected government took over on 21 March 1990, 
Namibia was faced with a number of challenges such as a much-skewed distribution 
of income (with the Gini coefficient greater than 70), low level of education and a 
large element of unskilled labour. As highlighted in 2.2.1 above, education and 
training is one of the determinants of income inequality. It is worth noting that income 
inequality has reduced since independence, though at a snail’s pace. This is evident 
from Figure 2.1 below. 
 
Figure 2.1 Gini coefficient trend 
 
Source:  Author’s depiction using data from Namibia Statistics Agency  
 
The government embarked on a number of redistribution policies and strategies with a 
view to equalising the much skewed distribution of income and correcting the errors 
of the Apartheid system. Employment and education opportunities had been offered 
on the basis of race and ethnicity, and this created a wide gap between the white and 
previously disadvantaged communities (Black people, Coloureds and Basters) of 
Namibia. It is worth noting that at independence in 1990, the white Namibians’ social 
pension was three times higher than that of the previously disadvantaged people. 
Discriminatory practices of this nature contribute extensively to income inequality as 
indicated by McConnell and Brue (2002) in section 2.2.1 above. The social pension of 
white citizens was frozen while upwardly adjusting the social pension of previously 
disadvantaged citizens until 1994, when the social pension was equalised at N$ 120. 
During the equalisation process, white Namibian pensioners were left worse-off 
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because their social pension was reduced by more than 30 percent (Bank of Namibia, 
2013). 
 
2.3.1   Redistribution policies and strategies 
Policies and initiatives that were put in place to address unequal distribution of 
income include:  
• Black Economic Empowerment 
• Affirmative Action Act, Act 29 of 1998 
• National poverty reduction strategy of 1998 
• Zero Hunger challenge 
• The New Equitable Economic Empowerment Framework 
 
a) Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)  
The BEE initiative was initiated with a view to bringing previously disadvantaged 
Namibians into the mainstream economy and to close the gap that existed between 
previously disadvantaged and previously advantaged individuals. BEE in Namibia is 
considered as an important poverty alleviation measure among indigenous Namibians 
who are considered “previously disadvantaged” due to the past colonial apartheid 
policies. The Namibian Black Economic Empowerment is applied without a National 
Black Economic Empowerment Policy. Despite that shortcoming, the Black 
Economic Empowerment Guidelines were developed by the government and 
government Offices, Ministries and Agencies (OMA’s), and private institutions are 
encouraged to formulate their own empowerment initiatives in alignment with the 
draft Black Economic Empowerment strategies. A BEE scorecard was formulated to 
measure the implementation of the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
objectives by the various sectors of the economy. The BEE scorecard is part of the 
Code of Good Practice (CGP) which measures compliance of all sectors of the 
economy. According to the Office of the Prime Minister (2005), the four components 
of the Codes of Good Practice are direct empowerment, human resources 
development, indirect empowerment and the residual sector specific indicator. The 
four codes of good practice, their subcomponents and weights are summarized in 
Table 2.2 below: 
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Table 2.2: Components and weights of the CGP 
Component Weight Subcomponent Weight  
Direct Empowerment 30 % Ownership 20 % 
Management and Control 10 % 
Human resources 
development 
30 %  Employment equity 10 % 
Training and skills development 20 % 
Indirect 
empowerment 
30 % Preferential procurement 20 % 
Enterprise development 10 % 
Residual sector 
specific indicator of 
their choice 
10%    
Source: Office of the Prime Minister  
 
b) Affirmative Action Act, Act 29 of 1998 
The second intervention is the Affirmative Action Act, Act 29 of 1998, which was 
developed to ensure that previously disadvantaged Namibians have equal employment 
opportunities and a fair representation in the workforce of relevant employers.  The 
formulation of the Affirmative Action Act was necessitated by the need to redress the 
wrongdoings of the past colonial apartheid system which provided employment 
opportunities to citizens on the basis of race and ethnicity. Previously disadvantaged 
Namibians were prohibited from occupying certain some positions and the 
Affirmative Action Act was established to fill the gap created by this practice. The 
Affirmative Action Act promotes skills development and training to ensure that 
previously disadvantaged persons are competent for the positions they occupy, 
thereby ensuring that performance standards are not compromised. To ensure proper 
implementation of the Affirmative Action Act, the Employment Equity Commission 
was established to enforce and keep track of the implementation of the affirmative 
action plan. In the implementation of the Affirmative Action Plan, the Namibian 
government (including SOEs and Parastatals) has been spearheading the process by 
appointing previously disadvantaged Namibians to management positions. 
c) National Poverty Reduction Strategy of 1998 and the Zero Hunger Challenge 
The third intervention is the National Poverty Reduction Strategy of 1998, which is 
aimed at reducing poverty drastically in the country. Following the approval of the 
poverty eradication strategy, the ‘Namibia Poverty Reduction Action Plan 2001-2005’ 
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was developed to fast-track the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy. 
Namibia has also adopted the Zero Hunger Challenge, which is one of the 17 
sustainable development goals. The fourth programme worth mentioning is the Food 
Bank, which was initiated by His Excellency Dr. Hage Geingob, the current President 
of Namibia. The Food Bank provides food supplies to vulnerable members of society 
in urban areas. To show his seriousness in reducing poverty in the country, Dr. 
Geingob formed a Ministry designated to specifically fight and end poverty in 
Namibia, which is referred to as the “Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social 
Welfare”. During the formulation of the First National Development Plan (NDP1), 
Namibia adopted the reduction of poverty as one of its national objectives. It is 
important to note that during NDP1, Namibia adopted the reduction of poverty over 
its alleviation or eradication. However, this time around, the government has 
committed its time and resources to eradicate poverty at all levels.   
 
d)  The New Equitable Economic Empowerment Framework  
The NEEEF is an initiative of the Namibian government, which is aimed at achieving 
equity using the procurement system of the government as the main instrument, 
considering the fact that government has one of the largest procurement systems in 
the country. As of this year (2018), the framework is at the final stage where inputs 
from stakeholders are being incorporated. The NEEEF consists of policies and 
guidelines that are crafted to deliberately motivate and encourage the private sector to 
involve previously disadvantaged Namibians in their operations and business 
activities in order to achieve the desired level of equity and national economic 
empowerment. In its quest to realise the required level of economic empowerment 
and equity, the Namibian government will use all legal instruments such as 
procurement and licensing in order to achieve its objective (Government of the 
Republic of Namibia, 2016). 
According to the Government of the Republic of Namibia (2016), the objectives of 
the NEEEF include but are not limited to the following: 
• Ensuring that the country’s resources are shared equitably and sustainably  by all 
Namibians; 
• Create a socially just society in which all citizens have equal opportunities 
regardless of their race, ethnicity, religion and political affiliation; 
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• Implement redistributive policies and strategies to address the challenge of 
unequal distribution of income and resources; 
• Create instruments and platforms for economic empowerment; 
• Ensure that previously disadvantaged Namibians are brought into the mainstream 
economy. 
 
 Pillars of national development planning 
In 2004 the Namibian government through the Office of the President developed 
Vision 2030, which is a high-level document aimed at fast-tracking Namibia’s 
national development. Vision 2030 is aimed at achieving prosperity, industrialization, 
peace and political stability in Namibia (Office of the President, 2004). Vision 2030 is 
a long-term vision of the government, which is implemented in five-year national 
plans, starting from NDP 2 to NDP 5. Each government Office, Ministry and Agency 
is required to develop a five-year strategic plan, which should incorporate NDP 
objectives. The five-year strategic plan for each government Office, Ministry and 
Agency is then cascaded to annual plans for implementation. In 2015 the Namibian 
government, through the Office of the President, spearheaded the development and 
finalisation of the Harambee Prosperity Plan (HPP). The HPP is a four-year plan 
aimed at accelerating economic growth in strategically selected sectors of the 
economy which are deemed critical for the growth and development of the Namibian 
economy. The Plan is designed to complement NDPs and Vision 2030. Namibia is 
currently implementing NDP 5, which aims to achieve greater efficiency in tax 
collection and broaden the revenue base of the government through tax reforms 
(National Planning Commission, 2017).   
 
 Taxation in Namibia  
2.5.1   Income tax 
Income tax policies and regulations in Namibia are guided by the Income Tax Act. It 
is worth noting that Namibia adopted a progressive income tax system, and the tax 
bracket was adjusted in 2015 to ensure that employees in the low-income category do 
not pay tax, thereby contributing towards the realisation of a fair distribution of 
income. Tax on income in Namibia ranges between 18 and 37 percent. The table 
below shows different tax rates for different income categories:  
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Table 2.3. Taxable personal income 
Income rage (N$) Tax rate 
0 - 50 000 Not taxable 
50 001 - 100 000 18 percent for each N$ above 50 000 
100 001 - 300 000  N$ 9 000 + 25 percent for each N$ above 100 000 
300 001 - 500 000  N$ 59 000 + 28 percent for each N$ above 300 000 
500 001 - 800 000  N$ 115 000 + 30 percent for each N$ above 500 000 
800 001 - 1 500 000  N$ 205 000 + 32 percent for each N$ above 800 000 
Above 1 500 000 N$ 429 000 + 37 percent for each N$ above 1 500 000 
Source: Ministry of Finance Website 
 
In Namibia it is the responsibility of an individual to submit a tax return form to the 
Receiver of Revenue Office once a year. The tax year runs from 1 March to 28 
February and employers are empowered to withhold the tax income of their 
employees and pay it directly to the Receiver of Revenue. The employer is tasked 
with a number of duties such as:  
a) To register as an employer with the Receiver of Revenue and inform the Receiver 
of Revenue in writing of any changes to the registration particulars.  
b) To keep track of the remuneration paid to every employee and the tax deducted. 
c) Deduct the correct amount of tax from the employees’ remuneration and be 
responsible for any errors that they may make along the way.  
d) Issue the PAYE5 certificate to all employees within one month after the end of the 
tax year (Ministry of Finance, 2018). 
Currently, the Receiver of Revenue office in Namibia is under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Finance. However, the Namibia Revenue Agency Act, Act 12 of 2017 
made provision for the establishment of Namibia Revenue Agency. The Revenue 
Agency will be responsible for all tax revenue collection related matters when it is 
operationalised. The powers and functions of the Revenue Agency include the 
following activities: collection and assessment of tax as mandated by the Act, and 
imposition of charges on overdue accounts and taxation related activities that are 
currently undertaken by the MoF. Once operationalised, the Revenue Agency will be 
the agent of the government that will be responsible for tax assessment and the 
collection and recording of government revenue under the direct supervision and 
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guidance of the Minister of Finance. The Revenue Agency was established with a 
view to ensuring effective and efficient revenue collection for the government. 
 
2.5.2   Tax exempted income 
The Income Tax Act provides for tax exemption for various income categories. Below 
is a summary of some of the tax exempted income types as per the Income tax Act, 
1981:  
a) Local and foreign dividends received by or accrued to any company.  
b) Salaries of any person who holds office in Namibia as an official of a government 
other than the government of Namibia, or of any agency of the United Nations as 
stipulated in section 16(c) of the Namibia Income Tax Act.  
c) Interest earned from deposits in the Namibia Post Office Savings Bank. 
d) Interest earned from stock or securities issued by the government of Namibia or 
any local authority.  
e) A bursary granted to a person to assist such a person to study at a recognised 
educational or research institution.  
f) A single grant given to a person upon obtaining a higher or additional academic 
qualification at a recognised institution of open learning. This refers to a grant that 
most private companies, Government and State Owned Enterprises give to 
individuals upon completion of an academic qualification. This grant is a form of 
motivation and a token of appreciation for the academic accomplishment.  
g) A uniform allowance given to an employee, which is clearly distinguishable from 
ordinary clothing.  
h) Compensation lump sum paid by the employer to the beneficiaries/family 
members in case of the death of an employee.  
i) N$ 300 000 of the lump sum gratuity payments received due to the relinquishment 
of any office by a person older than 55 years or due to ill health, superannuation, 
early retirement or termination of services due to redundancy.  
It is worth noting that income earned by a trust is taxed as a person; therefore, Table 
2.3 above is applicable for the taxation of trusts. Farmers are taxed in the same 
manner as individuals or companies with the exception of certain provisions 
pertaining to capital expenditure. Married persons in Namibia (husband and wife) are 
taxed separately. 
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2.5.3   Corporate income tax 
Corporate income tax in Namibia is guided by the Income Tax Act, the same statutory 
instrument which regulates personal income tax. The general corporate tax rate stands 
at 32 percent. Mining companies (excluding diamond mining companies) pay the 
corporate tax rate of 37.5 percent, while the diamond mining companies’ corporate 
tax rate stands at 55 percent. Corporate tax rates for petroleum companies (including 
exploration, development and production operation) stands at 35 percent. The table 
below presents a summary of corporate tax rates for various categories: 
 
Table 2.4 Corporate tax rates in Namibia (2017/18) 
Company Tax  Tax rate 
Corporate tax  32 percent 
Branch income tax  32 percent 
Diamond mining companies  55 percent 
Mining companies (apart from diamond mining companies)   37.5 
percent 
Long term insurance companies (40 percent of gross investment income taxed at 32 
percent)  
12.8 
percent 
Petroleum companies (exploration, development or production operations)  35 percent 
  Source: Ministry of Finance website 
 
Manufacturing companies in Namibia are treated differently in terms of corporate tax. 
Tax incentives are offered to manufacturing companies with a view to promoting 
manufacturing and industrialisation for the purpose of economic growth and 
employment creation. For the first ten years of operation of a manufacturing 
company, a special corporate tax rate of 18 percent is charged. After the end of the 10 
year incubation period, the normal corporate tax rate of 32 percent will become applicable.  
  
2.5.4   Value Added Tax and social security  
Value Added Tax (VAT) is a form of tax that is payable on the taxable value of all 
goods and services sold or imported in accordance with the Value Added Tax Act, 
Act 10 of 2000. The standard VAT rate in Namibia stands at 15 percent of the value 
of goods and services; however, basic goods are exempted from VAT to ensure 
affordability. These include white and brown sugar, maize and mahangu meal, sun 
flower cooking oil, fresh milk, animal fat used for the preparation of food, and bread, 
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among others. This is done with the purpose of making basic goods and services 
affordable to consumers in the low income category. Other goods and services that are 
exempted from VAT are exports of goods and services, financial services, medical 
services and services provided by hospitals, education services, local authorities, 
fringe benefits, supplies to foreign heads of state, public transport services and 
international transport services, among others. The exemption from VAT is however 
subject to specified terms and conditions. Any company, individual, trust or 
partnership carrying on a taxable activity with a turnover for the past or future 12-
month period in excess of N$ 500 000 is obliged to register for VAT. 
 
Social security operations and activities in Namibia are guided by the Social Security 
Act, Act 34 of 1994. The employer and employee are obliged to make a combined 
social security contribution of 1.8 percent of the employee’s basic salary on a 50-50 
basis. Both the employee and the employer are obliged to contribute 0.9 percent each 
to make up 1.8 percent. The maximum monthly social security contribution for both 
the employer and the employee is N$ 81, while the minimum amount payable by the 
employee and the employer is N$ 2.7. All employees under the age of 65 years are 
obliged to make monthly social security contributions and the employer is obliged to 
pay the social security contribution over to the Social Security Commission within 30 
days after the end of the month.  
 
2.5.5   Taxation and government revenue 
Taxation plays a major role as a vital source of revenue for the Namibian government 
and also as a fiscal policy instrument. In general, taxation is the main source of 
revenue for the Namibian government, contributing about 90 percent of total 
government revenue, and this is evident from the revenue figures below:  
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Figure 2.2: Government revenue from various taxes 
  
Source: Author’s depiction using data from national accounts 
 
Figure 2.3: Tax revenue as a percentage of total revenue 
 
Source: Author’s depiction using data from national accounts 
 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 above demonstrate that tax revenue, including customs and excise 
duties from SACU (SACU receipts) constitute more than 90 percent of total 
government revenue. With the exception of SACU receipts, tax revenue constitutes 
more than 50 percent of total government revenue. It is worth noting that three taxes 
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discussed above are among the explanatory variables considered for data analysis in 
this research.  
 
2.5.6   Customs and excise duties 
The Directorate of Customs and Excise in the Department of Revenue Management of 
the Ministry of Finance is responsible for the regulation and implementation of 
Customs and Excise laws in Namibia (Ministry of Finance, 2018). The Customs and 
Excise Act (Act no. 20 of 1998) regulates the functions and operations of the 
directorate of customs and excise. As mentioned in Chapter 1 above, Namibia is a 
member of the SACU, and therefore, customs duties are payable according to the 
CRP. Special duty rates apply to imports from SADC member states, while goods 
may be imported customs duty-free from Zimbabwe as per the Namibia-Zimbabwe 
Free Trade Agreement. Customs duties are payable when goods first enter the 
economic territory of any SACU Member State from outside SACU. No customs 
duties are payable when goods enter the economic territory of one Member State from 
another. For goods in transit, duties are collected at destinations, and therefore, no 
Member State collects duties on behalf of another. The excise duties are collected on 
specified goods that are produced and consumed within the SACU, and no excise 
duties are levied on the specified goods that are exported to non-SACU countries. The 
excise duties are payable at factory gate, and are not payable when the goods enter the 
economic territory of one Member State from another. Duties collected by Member 
States are transferred into the Common Revenue Pool (CRP) (SACU, 2013). SACU 
receipts have been a vital source of revenue for the Namibian government, 
constituting more than 30 percent of the total revenue of the government. This is 
evident from Figure 2.4 below, which depicts customs and excise duties received 
from the SACU Common Revenue Pool over a period of 21 years (1995-2016): 
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Figure 2.4 Customs and excise duties paid to Namibia from SACU CRP 
 
Source: Author’s depiction using data from the Bank of Namibia Annual Reports  
 
2.5.7   Transfer and stamp duties  
The acquisition of an immovable property by a natural person in Namibia is subject to 
transfer duty. Land acquired by a natural person for agricultural purposes and funded 
by the Agricultural Bank of Namibia is charged a special rate. Table 2.5 below 
presents the rates of duty payable by a natural person for the acquisition of any 
immovable property, including mineral rights.  
 
Table 2.5 Transfer duties for properties acquired by natural persons (including mineral rights 
and excluding the acquisition of agricultural land) 
Value Rates of duty  
N$ 0 - N$ 400 000 0 percent 
N$400 001 - N$ 800 000 1 percent 
N$800 001 - N$ 1 500 000 N$ 4000 + 5 percent 
> N$1 500 000  N$39 000 + 3 percent 
Source: Author’s depiction using data from the Ministry of Finance website 
 
Any other property, including mineral rights, acquired by persons other than natural 
persons, including trusts, is charged a transfer duty of 12 percent of the value of the 
property.  
 
Stamp duty guidelines and activities are stipulated in the Stamp Duties Act of 1993. 
Stamp duties are charged at different rates on instruments executed in Namibia as 
stipulated in the Stamp Duties Act. Instruments that are subject to stamp duties are 
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life insurance policies, bonds and deeds of sale relating to immovable property, 
among others. In the next section, government expenditure and its linkage with 
taxation will be discussed.    
   
 Overview of the Namibian government expenditure  
Government expenditure is composed of all government investment, consumption and 
transfer payments, which consist of income transfers (pensions, social benefits, etc.) 
and capital transfer. The Namibian government has been prioritising various sectors 
such as education, health, national defence and agriculture because of their 
significance to the national economy. Government expenditure is properly captured in 
the national accounts published by the Namibia Statistics Agency (NSA). According 
to the Ministry of Finance (2018), the Namibian National Accounts estimations are 
published in line with international standards, the 1993 System of National Accounts 
(SNA). The National Accounts in Namibia are produced bi-annually and are revised 
for the latest three years. The Preliminary National Accounts are published during 
April of each year, while the Annual National Accounts are released in September of 
each year. Figure 2.5 below presents government expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
over a period of 10 years (2007 - 2016). 
 
Figure 2.5: Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Author’s depiction using data from the national accounts 
 
Based on the graph above, average government expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
over the period of ten years (2007 - 2016) is 24.644 percent. This is an indication that 
government has a significant and dominant role to play in the national economy. The 
30 
 
Namibian government expenditure has been increasing steadily over the past few 
years and this can be observed from Figure 2.6 below: 
 
Figure 2.6: Namibian government expenditure 
 
Source: Author’s depiction using data from the national accounts 
 
Based on Figure 2.6 above, government expenditure on GDP at current prices has 
more than doubled within the 10-year period. This gradual increment is replicated in 
essential areas of the economy such as government expenditure on social safety net, 
education, health, etc. These expenditures are discussed in detail in the next 
subsections.  
 
2.6.1   Namibia’s social safety net 
Namibia is among the few African countries that provide non-contributory pensions 
to vulnerable citizens in the country. The findings of this research indicate that 
government expenditure on social pensions has a balancing/improvement impact on 
income inequality. The government of the Republic of Namibia provides social 
pensions to vulnerable members of the society in the following categories: the 
Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Welfare provides Old Age Pension (60 
and above), Disability Pension and funeral benefits to its members. The disability 
pension is provided to Namibian citizens with mental or physical disabilities to enable 
them to afford basic needs.  The Office of the Prime Minister through the Department 
of Veteran Affairs  provides a War Veterans Allowance to qualifying war veterans of 
the liberation struggle, while the Ministry of Gender Equality and Social welfare 
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provides the Place of Safety allowance, Special Maintenance Allowance (for orphan 
children) and Maintenance Grant (Bank of Namibia, 2013). The graph below shows 
government expenditure on social pensions in Namibia:  
 
Figure 2.7: Government expenditure on social pensions 
 
Source: Author’s depiction using data from the Bank of Namibia 15th Annual Symposium, 2013 
and the Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Welfare  
 
Figure 2.7 above depicts a steady increase in government expenditure on social 
pensions from 1999 to 2014 and a sharp increment in the 2015/16 financial year. This 
can be attributed to the adjustment in social pension from N$ 600 to N$ 1100 in 
2015/2016, which represents an increment of more than 80 percent. The bar graph 
below presents social pension adjustments from 1994 to 2017. For the purpose of this 
research, government expenditure on social pensions is considered as an explanatory 
variable. 
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Figure 2.8: Social pension adjustments from 1994 - 2017  
  
Source: Author’s depiction using data from the Bank of Namibia 15th Annual Symposium and 
the Ministry of poverty Eradication and Social Welfare 
 
2.6.2   Government expenditure on health and education 
The health and education sectors have been on the priority list of the Namibian 
government over the years due to their significant role in the growth and development 
of the national economy. In Namibia. Public health services are almost free, 
considering the fact that the rates charged to access health services at government 
health institutions in Namibia are close zero. The Ministry of Health provides 
antiretroviral drugs to HIV/AIDS patients free of charge to an estimated number of 
168 000 people who are on treatment (UNAIDS, 2017). In addition to that, the 
Ministry of Health also provides free drugs to patients with various illnesses such as 
TB, cancer, high blood pressure and mental disorders, among others. The Ministry of 
Health operates approximately 340 hospitals, clinics and health care centres 
nationwide. The government through the Ministry of Health and Social Services 
incurs the cost of paying all health professionals, drugs and medical equipment in all 
government health centres countrywide.  
  
In terms of education, the Namibian government introduced Universal Primary 
Education in 2013, whereby all primary education costs are catered for by the 
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government. During the same period, the government also took over the responsibility 
of providing free pre-primary education in the country. Initially, pre-primary 
education was the responsibility of the parents, and all related costs were catered for 
by the parents before the new reform. The government also heavily subsidises 
secondary and tertiary education. The government also provides loans, scholarships 
and grants to tertiary institution students through Namibia Students Financial 
Assistance fund (NSFAF). During the period under research (1996 - 2016), 
government expenditure on education increased from N$ 1,199 million to N$ 15,821 
million while government expenditure on health increased from N$ 713 million to N$ 
7,230 million in the same period. Figure 2.9 below presents government expenditure 
on education and health (1996 - 2016). 
 
Figure 2.9: Government expenditure on education and health 
 
Source: Author’s depiction using data from Ministry of education, Bank of Namibia and 
Ministry of Education  
 
 Conclusion  
This chapter provided an overview of the status of income distribution as well as 
taxation and government expenditure components in Namibia. From independence in 
1990, a number of income redistribution initiatives and policies were put in place to 
redress the wrongdoings of the former colonial apartheid government. These policies 
and initiatives include the BEE, Affirmative Action Act, National poverty reduction 
strategy, the Zero Hunger challenge, and the NEEEF. These policies and initiatives 
are incorporated in the national development planning agenda of the government. The 
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government objectives and plans are strategically implemented and cascade from 
Vision 2030 to the NDP’s and OMA’s strategic, annual and quarterly plans to 
individual quarterly and monthly plans.  
 
It can be observed that government expenditure on education and health has more 
than tripled over the past 14 years and this can be attributed to the growing 
population, which leads to an increased demand for government education and health 
services. Statistics clearly indicate that taxes, customs and excise duties are the main 
source of the Namibian government revenue, contributing more than 95 percent of 
government revenue. Government expenditure on social pensions has more than 
doubled over the past six years due to a number of factors, of which the main one are 
highlighted below. Firstly, the sharp increase in government expenditure on social 
pensions is due to an increase in the proportion of the population that is receiving 
social pensions. Secondly, the sharp increment can be attributed to an 83.33 percent 
increment in the old age pension in 2015.  In general, it is evident that the government 
has made some strides in reducing income inequality as indicated by the declining 
Gini coefficient over the period of 1996-2016. However, more needs to be done to 
bring the Gini coefficient to an acceptable level.  
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of theoretical and empirical research and information 
from various sources that are related to the research topic. The chapter is designed to 
provide theoretical and empirical foundation of this research project. It highlights the 
findings of various researchers on the topic and it covers the methodologies used in 
the empirical literatures. The chapter also looks at conflicting and contradicting 
literature as well as conformity to general theories.   
 
 Theoretical literature review  
3.2.1  Keynesian theory on taxation and government expenditure 
In his most influential publication, “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money,” Keynes (1936) highlighted the need for government to intervene in the 
national economy in order to correct market failures. He indicated that the capitalist 
system has disastrous weaknesses because it has failed to reduce income inequality 
and unemployment in the national economy. On that basis, Keynes argues that the 
government should employ fiscal and monetary policies to realise an equitable 
distribution of income, and full employment. Keynes believes that fiscal policy (the 
use of taxation and government expenditure) is more efficient in stimulating the 
national economy as opposed to monetary policy (the use of interest rates and money 
supply).  Keynes (1936) emphasised that the capitalist system is capable of remaining 
in a state of unequal distribution of income, high unemployment rate and low 
economic growth for a long period of time with no sign of recovery or collapsing. 
This concept became evident during the period preceding the Second World War, in 
which some countries experienced persistent unemployment and stagnant economic 
growth.  Various economists have interpreted this phenomenon as Keynes’s postulate 
that involuntary unemployment can persist as an equilibrium phenomenon (Snowdon 
and Vane, 2005). Keynes strongly rejected Adam Smith’s theory of uncontrolled 
“laissez-faire” in which the capitalist economy is assumed to be self-adjusting 
towards the equilibrium level. Keynes’s argument is that a laissez-faire capitalist 
economy could possess equilibria characterised by massive involuntary 
unemployment, and that therefore, intervention in the capitalist economy is required 
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to correct market failures. Keynes (1936) argues that if government is to be effective 
in correcting market failures, it should not execute activities which can be effectively 
and efficiently executed by the private sector, but rather attend to those functions 
which the private sector cannot provide. The Keynesian approach to correcting market 
failure is by means of fiscal and monetary policies. When the economy is going 
through a recession, Keynes suggests the use of fiscal policy to stabilise the economy 
by lowering taxes and increasing government expenditure. The reduction in taxes 
increases the marginal propensity to consume, which will consequently lead to an 
increase in the consumption of consumers. An increase in consumption subsequently 
leads to an increase in total demand which results in the growth of the economy in 
totality. The additional money in the economy creates a positive multiplier effect, 
thereby creating more jobs and reducing poverty and income inequality. This shifts 
the Aggregate Demand curve to the right, thereby increasing real GDP as shown in 
Figure 3.1 below.  
Figure 3.1: Impact of expansionary fiscal policy 
 
PL represents the price level, SRAS is the short-run aggregate supply, LRAS is the 
Long-Run Aggregate Supply curve, E1 and E2 represent the equilibrium level at 
different levels of output and AD represents Aggregate Demand.  According to 
Brown-Collier and Collier (1995), Keynes believes that planned government 
expenditure/investment is more likely to be successful than the interest rate policy. 
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However, Barro (1990) warns that excessive involvement of government in economic 
activities can have detrimental effects on economic growth. He highlighted that 
unnecessary involvement of government in economic activities can lead to a large 
government budget which consequently leads to an increase in taxes to finance the 
increased government expenditure. High taxes leads to a reduction in the marginal 
propensity to save, to consume and to invest, which subsequently retards economic 
growth.  Barro (1990) further indicates that government expenditure will have both 
short-term and long-term effects on economic growth.  
 
3.2.2   Theory of public goods 
The provision of public goods and taxation has been researched extensively by 
economists and researchers such as Samuelson and Pigou, who nurtured the theory of 
public goods to its current state. Economists define public goods as goods that have 
two key characteristics of public goods, namely non-excludability and non-rivalry. 
Any good that possess one of the two characteristics can be categorised as a public 
good. Goods with both characteristics are called pure public goods, e.g. national 
defence and police services. The provision of public goods requires funding from the 
government, and the two common sources of government funds are taxes or/and 
borrowing. In developing countries, donor funding also forms a large portion of the 
national budget. Samuelson (1958) indicates that some goods can be either in the 
category of public goods or in the category of private goods such as railroads, 
provision of water, electricity supply and postal services among others. Samuelson 
(1954) indicates that there are no good incentives or appealing motivation for the 
provision of public goods in the private sector, and therefore, if they are produced, 
they will not be produced efficiently. In some cases, the private sector cannot produce 
these goods at all. The provision of these goods by the government is therefore 
required for efficiency. Samuelson (1954) indicates that public goods are under-
produced in the private sector, or may not be produced at all, since there is no 
motivation to produce these goods except by charges to the citizens through taxation 
and user fees, and to channel these earning towards the production of these goods. He 
emphasised that the development and usage of public goods provides justification for 
government expenditure/production. In his publication on public goods, Kaplow 
(1996) concluded that under standard simplifying assumptions, there is a way of 
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modifying the income tax to finance a public good such that the marginal cost for the 
provision of the public good is equivalent to the marginal utility derived from the 
consumption of that particular good. Samuelson (1955) indicates that all 
redistributions take place through tax policies and transfer expenditure. Transfer 
expenditure includes the provision of public goods such as education and health 
services. The method of finance involves adjusting the income tax so that at each 
income level, tax increases achieve the desired benefit from the consumption of a 
public good. Samuelson (1958) pointed out that government expenditure on public 
goods is aimed at maximising the social welfare benefits of the citizens while 
consumers of public goods aim to maximise their utility. Pigou (1932) indicated that 
expenditure should be spent at the point at which the utility obtained from the 
consumption of a public good is at the maximum, and this is referred to as the 
maximum social advantage theory. The maximum social advantage theory stipulates 
that resources should be allocated optimally in order to obtain the maximum social 
advantage. According to Pigou (1932) the optimum level of resource allocation is 
reached at a point where the marginal return is equal to the marginal cost, and in the 
case of public goods, this is the point where marginal social cost is equal to the 
marginal social benefits.  The marginal social cost is derived from taxation while the 
marginal social benefits are derived from government expenditure. It is however 
worth noting that it is practically impossible to determine the optimal level for the 
provision of public goods due to the complexities associated with the determination of 
marginal social costs and marginal social benefits.  
 
3.2.3   Peacock-Wiseman hypothesis  
The Peacock-Wiseman Hypothesis represents the supply side of government 
expenditure which is based on the political theory of government expenditure 
determination. This hypothesis states that governments are willing to increase 
government expenditure, but taxpayers are not willing to pay high taxes. Peacock and 
Wiseman (1967) conducted an analysis on the growth of government expenditure in 
the United Kingdom from 1890 to 1955. The results indicate that as the economy 
grows, tax revenue will also grow at constant tax rates, thus leading to an increase in 
government expenditure. The Peacock-Wiseman Hypothesis postulates that, under 
normal circumstances, government expenditure would show a steady upward trend, 
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but that this trend would be distracted during periods of economic turbulences such as 
wars, social and natural disasters, etc. In such situations, the Peacock-Wiseman 
Hypothesis suggests an increment in taxation to cater for the unexpected increase in 
government expenditure. This phenomenon is referred to as the 'displacement effect'. 
Government expenditure is displaced upwards during the crisis period, thereby 
displacing private expenditure for government expenditures. The process represents 
an upward shift in the government expenditure curve.  After the crisis, government 
expenditure does not fall to its original level and citizens accept the upwardly adjusted 
tax level. Auld and Miller (1977) analysed data for the United Kingdom from 1890 - 
1955 and their analysis indicates the presence of the ‘displacement effect’. The 
Peacock-Wiseman hypothesis is based on the following assumptions regarding the 
nature of the state: 
a)  Decisions regarding government  expenditure are taken politically, therefore, 
they can be influenced  through the ballot box or by whatever medium that 
citizens can use to pressurise the government,  
b) Political choices regarding the utilization of the resources differ from choices in  
the market system, and  
c) Citizens can have ideas about desirable government expenditure which are quite 
different and at times incompatible with their ideas about the tolerable burden of 
taxation. On that basis, the government closely observes the reaction of citizens 
to the tax rates imposed.  
In testing the Peacock-Wiseman hypothesis, Reddy (1972) conducted an empirical 
research on the growth of government expenditure in India, using data from 1872 to 
1968. The research findings indicate the presence of the ‘displacement effect’.  
 
3.2.4   Wagner’s Law 
Wagner’s Law was developed by Adolf Wagner in 1893, and this law of increasing 
government expenditure is based on historical facts, mostly German historical facts at 
that time. Wagner’s law highlighted that government expenditure tends to grow 
relative to economic growth, which means that as a country grows economically, 
government will also be required to increase its essential services, hence an increase 
in government expenditure. Wagner’s law attempted to establish a direct link between 
economic development and growth and the relative size of government sector and 
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subsequently government expenditure. Wagner’s law states that an increase in 
government expenditure represents a change in the economic activities in the country 
and that government expenditure grows faster than output. According to Wagner’s 
law, government expenditure tends to increase in two different ways, namely, 
extensively and intensively. In his hypothesis, extensive growth refers to the 
execution of new activities and functions that are required as the economy grows and 
as time passes. In this case, an expansion of government work will consequently lead 
to an expansion in government expenditure. Intensive growth refers to the 
government’s quest to execute both old and new functions more efficiently and 
effectively.  Wagner’s law highlighted three main reasons why government 
expenditure in a progressive economy tends to increase. These are:  
a) As the economy grows, government expenditure increases due to an increase in 
the structure of the economy which would require increased expenditure to cater 
for new laws and the expansion of the legal structure to meet the sophisticated 
needs of the growing economy. The growing economy is in most cases 
accompanied by a growing population and hence the need to spend more on 
education, social pensions, health and other public goods and services to cater for 
the growing needs of the expanding population.  
b) Increased urbanisation leads to a much larger per capita expenditure on civil 
amenities required to deal with the increased urban population. Urbanization 
exerts pressure on municipalities and town councils to increase their services to 
cater for the increased number of people who are moving from small towns and 
rural areas to big cities. These services include the provision of public transport 
and servicing of urban land, among others. On that basis, a progressive economy 
will always experience growth in government expenditure.  
c) Public goods such as education, healthcare and recreation facilities have a high 
income elasticity of demand which implies that an increase in the income of the 
citizens will lead to an exponential increase in the demand for public goods. This 
would require the government to increase its expenditure to meet the growing 
needs of the society. We can therefore summarise that, as the economy grows, the 
demand for public goods and services will increase exponentially, which 
consequently leads to an increase in government expenditure. 
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Various economists argue that a continuous increase in government investment is 
required to correct market failures such as monopolies, wealth/ income inequalities 
and externalities. Bird (1971) criticised Wagner’s law because it applies only to 
countries with specific features. Bird (1971) pointed out that Wagner’s law can only 
apply to nations with the following features:   
a)  Countries that have an increasing per capita income; 
b)  Countries that are experiencing technological and institutional changes of a 
certain form and at least implicitly, democratisation in the form of wider political 
participation of the polity.  
On that basis, Wagner’s law appears to exclude countries with stagnant economies or 
populations and countries with limited institutional and technological changes.  
 
3.2.5   A rational theory of the size of government  
Meltzer and Richard (1981) analysed the impact of taxation and government 
expenditure on the distribution of income in their publication titled “A Rational 
Theory of the Size of Government”. The underlying principle of this theory is that 
government uses taxation and government spending for redistribution purposes. This 
notion is in line with the findings of the research conducted by Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994), whose findings indicate that there is a very high demand for redistributive 
initiatives in communities where a large proportion of the population has limited or no 
access to the factors of production of the economy, to avoid conflict and 
destabilisation of the national economy. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) argue that conflict 
over unequal distribution of income and wealth has a negative impact on the growth 
of the economy. In their analysis, Meltzer and Richard (1981) indicate that a 
government that wishes to be re-elected would use a positive tax on income to 
channel funds to median voters if the median voters’ earnings are below average 
income. Meltzer and Richard (1981) concluded that government expenditure and 
taxes have grown proportionally to economic growth in most countries with elected 
governments for a period of 30 years or longer. This implies that as the economy 
grows, government expenditure will also increase to cater for the growing needs of 
society. The increment in the relative size of government appeared to be independent 
of the budget and tax system, federal or national government and other institutional 
arrangements. However, the relative rates of change in different countries may change 
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depending on these arrangements. The Meltzer-Richard model is based on the 
following assumptions:  
• There are a number of individuals; 
• Each individual takes prices, wages, and tax rates as given, derived from the 
market for commodities and labour and by the polity;  
• Differences in the choice of labour, leisure, and consumption and differences in 
wages arise solely because of differences in endowments which reflect differences 
in productivity. 
 
This model suggests that the size of the government is determined by the ratio of 
average income relative to the income of the decisive voter. According to Meltzer and 
Richard (1983), changes in the age composition of the population that increase the 
proportion of the population receiving social pensions also increase government 
expenditure for redistributive purposes and consequently lead to high taxes on labour 
income. The tests of Meltzer and Richard (1983) also indicate that changes in 
productivity or in the labour force participation, which lead to reduction in the 
average income relative to the income of the decisive voter, lead to a reduction in the 
size of the government. The findings indicate that the ratio of government expenditure 
for redistribution to total income, and the share of aggregate income redistributed in 
cash, rise and fall with the ratio of mean to median income and the level of income. 
Other government expenditures such as education, health, etc., were also found to rise 
and fall with the ratio of mean to median income, but appear to be independent of the 
levels of income. The next subsection presents the tax incidence theory. 
 
3.2.6   The tax incidence theory  
Mieszkowski (1969) conducted a review of the impact of taxes on income distribution 
and concluded that the burden of a relative income tax that is applied on the entire 
income is relative to the household’s share in the national income. Mieszkowski’s 
theory implies that taxes that are not imposed on all kinds of income, or on all 
commodities, change commodity prices, influence factor use in specific industries and 
change the production structure of the economy. The modern general equilibrium 
incidence theory is based on the marginal productivity theory of distribution that 
assumes that businesses choose to produce at a point where costs are at a minimum 
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and profits are at a maximum. Mieszkowski (1969) employed the neoclassical 
assumptions in his analysis of the effects of taxes on the distribution of income. These 
assumptions are that:  
• There is perfect competition in the market for commodities and factors of 
production; 
• The economy is closed (there is no cross-border trade); 
• There are perfect factors of production mobility;  
• Finally, the total supplies of all factors of production are in perfectly inelastic 
supply to the economy as a whole.  
 
In his earlier work, Mieszkowski (1967) conducted an analysis on the general 
equilibrium propositions of the incidence theory. The main focus of the analysis was 
on the calculation of the differential incidence of various general taxes, partial 
commodity taxes, and partial factor taxes, and on analysis of the factors which 
determine whether the substitution of one form of tax finance for another form of tax 
increases or decreases the real income of a particular group. The results of his 
research indicate that an income tax on gross income is equivalent to a general sales 
tax that is applied on gross value and applies to capital goods as well as consumption 
goods. The results also indicate that a VAT that is applied at the same rate on the 
production of consumption and capital goods and under which the depreciation of 
capital is subtracted from the tax base is equal to a relative income tax on net income. 
 
 Empirical literature review 
This section presents the empirical literature review of the work by various 
researchers and scholars whose empirical research has relevance to the analysis of the 
impact of taxation and government expenditure components on income inequality in 
Namibia. The empirical literature is demarcated according to the method of study.  
This section is designed to provide an in-depth understanding of the research topic 
from the empirical analysis point of view and to provide the empirical 
foundation/footing of this research.   
 
Various scholars and researchers have analysed the impact of taxation and 
government expenditure components on income distribution, with most of the 
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empirical findings indicating that taxation and government expenditure components 
are statistically significant in influencing income inequality in general. Leu, et al., 
(2009) carried out a research to analyse the impact of government policies on income 
distribution in Switzerland using the Budget incidence approach. In conducting their 
investigation, Leu, et al., (2009) used data from the first nationwide representative 
Income and Wealth Survey. The findings of their research indicate that government 
expenditures are more effective in redistributing national income as opposed to direct 
taxes. Social welfare expenditures were found to be more effective in redistributing 
national income as opposed to other government expenditures. Their research further 
indicate that indirect taxes have an unbalancing effect on the distribution of income.  
 
Regarding government expenditure on education, Tsanos and Manos (1999) 
conducted empirical research on the distributional impact of government education 
expenditure in Greece using micro-data of the 1987/88 Greek Household Budget 
Survey which was conducted by the National Statistical Service of Greece. Tsanos 
and Manos (1999) segmented the education component into three segments, namely, 
primary, secondary and tertiary education. Secondary education was further 
segmented into lower-secondary education and upper-secondary education while 
tertiary education was further segmented into higher education institutions and 
technological education institutions. Tsanos and Manos (1999) employed hedonic 
regression techniques to estimate their model. The research findings indicate that 
government expenditure on primary and secondary education is undoubtedly 
significant in reducing inequality on aggregate. Education expenditure on tertiary 
education was found to have an unbalancing/regressive effect on inequality.  
 
The effects of education expenditure on income inequality have been researched 
widely by various researchers, and the most of the findings undoubtedly indicate a 
balancing effect on income inequality. Sylwester (2002) conducted research on the 
effects of government expenditure on education on income inequality using cross-
sectional data of a selected number of countries. In analysing the effects of 
government expenditure, Sylwester (2002) used the Gini coefficient as a proxy for 
income inequality and the empirical research findings indicate that countries whose 
governments devote more financial resources to education as a percentage of GDP 
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experienced lower income inequality in subsequent years. In conducting the research, 
Sylwester (2002) employed the least square regression method and White’s correction 
for heteroscedasticity. The findings of the research undoubtedly indicate that 
government expenditure on education has a balancing effect on income inequality in 
both developed and developing countries. Sylwester (2002) concluded that allocating 
more government resources to the education sector will lead to a reduction in income 
inequality.  
 
Another research conducted by Vaalavuo (2013) indicated that social expenditure by 
government has a balancing effect on income inequality. Vaalavuo (2013) conducted 
empirical research on the re-distributional impact of traditional and modern/new 
social expenditure by the governments of six selected European countries, namely, 
France, the Netherlands, Slovenia, United Kingdom, Spain and Denmark. The 
research employed the imputation method as an estimation tool.  The findings of the 
empirical research by Vaalavuo (2013) indicate that traditional social expenditure by 
government, e.g. old age cash benefits or social pensions, is effective in reducing 
income inequality because it is directed towards the bottom income quintiles as 
opposed to the new social expenditure methods. The research findings further indicate 
that the inclusion of government services in the model further reduces income 
inequality.  
 
The existing theories of taxation suggest that taxation is very effective in reducing 
income inequality and that labour taxes are effective in reducing income inequality, as 
opposed to consumption taxes. This theory is supported by the empirical research 
findings of Mylonidis and Losifidi (2017), in which they analysed the redistributive 
effects of taxation using a panel of 17 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries over a period of 31 years. In conducting their 
research, they employed the two stage least squares estimation method. The findings 
of the research by Mylonidis and Losifidi (2017) indicate that direct taxes such as 
progressive income taxes/labour taxes are effective in reducing income inequality, as 
opposed to consumption taxes such as value added tax or general sales tax. In 
conducting their empirical research, Mylonidis and Losifidi (2017) identified and 
analysed tax rates that are comparative among across the selected OECD countries 
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with the view to levelling the playing field. The primary focus of their research was to 
analyse how a change in the combination of different tax rates, namely, labour, 
consumption and capital taxes affect inequality in OECD countries. With regard to the 
change in the tax mix, the research findings indicate that an increase in the tax burden 
on labour relative to capital leads to an increase in income inequality. Increasing the 
tax burden on consumption relative to capital was also found to have an unbalancing 
effect on income inequality. The research findings further indicate that income 
equality improves with an increase in the tax burden on labour relative to 
consumption. The research findings indicate that the distributive power of labour 
taxes is very significant in reducing income inequality.  The research findings of 
Mylonidis and Losifidi (2017) indicate that a tax mix is more effective in reducing 
inequality and poverty as opposed to one specific tax in general. On that basis, 
Mylonidis and Losifidi (2017) recommend a tax mix as an effective income 
redistribution measure as opposed to one specific tax.   The research findings also 
reveal that the gap between the poor and the rich has widened over the past three 
decades in OECD countries.   
 
Researchers and scholars have generally accepted that the gap between the poor and 
the rich has increased over the past decades.  A research by Wittenberg (2017) on the 
wages and wage inequality in South Africa substantiated this claim.  Wittenberg 
(2017) used 1994-2011 data from October Household Surveys and Quarterly Labour 
Force Surveys. To deal with measurement issues such as outliers, bracket data and 
missing values, Wittenberg (2017) used three procedures, namely, the BACON 
algorithm for outlier detection, extreme stundentised regression residuals and robust 
regression. These procedures ensure data quality and reliability of the results. 
Wittenberg (2017) pointed out that it is not possible/sufficient to read wage trends 
from raw data without applying various data adjustment methods. Data quality 
adjustment approaches considered by Wittenberg (2017) include the mid-point 
imputation, reweighting, multiple imputation, hot deck, point and mean imputation 
approach. The empirical research findings of Wittenberg (2017) indicate that 
inequality in earnings among employees in South Africa has increased during the 
period of 1994-2011. Considering that the labour markets of South Africa and 
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Namibia are closely intertwined, the same assumption can be made for Namibia. 
However, empirical research will be required to substantiate this statement.  
 
Most economists and researchers generally accept the effectiveness of taxation and 
government expenditure policies in reducing income inequality. Martinez-Vasquez, 
Moreno-Dodson and Vulovic (2012) cement this notion with the research findings on 
‘the impact of Taxation and Expenditure policies on income distribution’. Martinez-
Vasquez., et al. (2012) indicate that taxation policy is statistically significant in 
reducing income inequality. In conducting their analysis, Martinez-Vasquez., et al. 
(2012) employed the generalised method of moments approach (GMM) which is 
considered appropriate for a research of that nature.  The research conducted by 
Martinez-Vasquez., et al. (2012) indicates that taxes and government expenditure 
have a significant effect on income distribution. The research is based on data from a 
sample of 150 countries over a period of 36 years from 1970-2006. Martinez-
Vasquez., et al. (2012) indicate that when progressive income taxes are considered 
separately, they tend to have a balancing/improvement effect on income inequality, 
leading to a decrease inequality. The research further indicates that general 
consumption taxes (e.g. tax on products), excise and custom duties have an 
unbalancing effect on the distribution of income. On the expenditure side, the research 
findings indicate that large proportions of GDP on social welfare activities, education 
services, health services have a balancing/improvement effect on the distribution of 
income, both individually and collectively. It should however be noted that different 
countries may have different empirical results for similar variables because each 
country has different economic and environmental factors which may influence the 
relevance of each variable.  
 
 Conclusion  
This chapter presented the review of empirical and theoretical literature on the impact 
of taxation and expenditure policies on income distribution. Theoretical literature 
review includes the Keynesian theory, the theory of public goods, the Peacock-
Wiseman hypothesis, Wagner’s Law, the rational theory of the size of government 
and the tax incidence theory. The Keynesian theory states that there is a need for the 
government to intervene in the national economy in order to correct market failures 
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such as unequal distribution of income and unemployment, among others. This 
government intervention is done through fiscal and monetary policy instruments to 
realise equitable distribution of income and full employment. The theory of public 
goods states that there is no good incentive for the production of public goods in the 
private sector, and that therefore, they should be produced by the government. The 
government has to charge people for the production of these goods through taxation. 
The Wiseman-Peacock hypothesis represents the supply side of government 
expenditure, which postulates that decisions on government expenditure are taken 
politically and can be influenced by voting. This hypothesis states that as the economy 
grows, tax revenue will also grow at constant tax rates, thus leading to an increase in 
government expenditure.  
 
Wagner’s Law states that as the economy grows, government expenditure will also 
grow at a higher rate than that the economy. Wagner’s law specified three factors 
which lead to an increase in government expenditure and these are: the need to fund 
new structures and laws for the expanding economy, the need to finance new 
urbanization related developments and the need to expand the provision of public 
goods because they have a high income elasticity of demand. The rational theory of 
the size of government states that governments use taxation and government 
expenditure for redistribution purposes and that there is an increased demand for the 
redistributive initiatives in societies with unequal distribution of income and wealth.  
 
Empirical literature reviews include the research by Leu, et al., (2009), Mylonidis and 
Losifidi (2017), Martinez-Vasquez., at al (2012), Sylwester (2002), Tsanos and 
Manos (2009), Vaalavuo (2013) and Wittenberg (2017). The empirical literature 
indicates that social transfers such as government expenditure on social pension, 
education and health have a balancing/improvement effect on the distribution of 
income. Empirical literature further indicates that direct taxes have a 
balancing/improving effect on the distribution of income while indirect taxes such as 
tax on products have an unbalancing/worsening effect on the distribution of income. It 
is worth noting that there is no literature for Namibia on the research topic, therefore, 
the results of this research will play a major role in filling the literature gap.  
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CHAPTER 4:  METHODOLOGY 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodology used in undertaking this research. It includes 
the data sources and research method, empirical model specification, qualities of a 
good model, definition and measurement of variables, estimation methods/techniques, 
diagnostic tests, and lastly, a brief conclusion of the chapter. 
 
 Empirical model specification  
The ARDL bounds test approach to cointegration was employed for this study. The 
dependent variable for this research is the Gini coefficient (G), which is the 
proxy/measure of income inequality. On the taxation side, the independent variables 
for this thesis are tax on income and wealth (TIW), tax on products (TP), corporate 
income tax (CIT) and customs and excise duty from SACU (CE). On the expenditure 
side, the independent variables are government expenditure on social pensions 
(GESP), government expenditure on education (GEE) and government expenditure on 
health (GEH). The research employed the linear log regression model as used by 
Manning and Mullahy (2001). This research is a modified version of an empirical 
research conducted by Leu, et al., (2009), titled “Taxes, expenditures and income 
distribution in Switzerland”. In their research, Leu, et al., (2009), analysed the impact 
of government policies on income distribution and poverty in Switzerland. In 
conducting their investigation, Leu, et al., (2009), used mainly data from the first 
countrywide representative Income and Wealth Survey. The findings of their research 
indicate that government expenditures are more effective in redistributing national 
income as opposed to direct taxes. Social welfare expenditures were found to be more 
effective in redistributing national income as opposed to other government 
expenditures. Their research further indicate that indirect taxes have an unbalancing 
effect on the distribution of income. This research is modified to focus specifically on 
the impact of taxation and expenditure components on income distribution in 
Namibia. The empirical model that was used in undertaking this research is specified 
in a functional form as follows: 
G = f (GESP, GEE, GEH, TP, TIW, CE, CIT)             (4.1) 
Equation (4.1) above is expressed in an econometrics equation as specified below:  
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 Gt =β0 +β1GESPt + β2GEEt+β3GEHt + β4TPt+β5TIWt + β6CEt +β7CITt + ℇt (4.2)  
Where:  
G  =  Gini coefficient 
GESP  =  Government Expenditure on Social Pensions  
GEE  =  Government Expenditure on Education 
GEH =  Government Expenditure on Health 
TP  =  Tax on Products/VAT 
TIW =  Tax on Income and Wealth 
CE  =  Customs and Excise duties from SACU  
CIT =  Corporate Income Tax 
ℇ =  Stochastic error term  
β’s       =  Coefficients  
t       =  Time/period  
β1 to β7 represents the coefficients of the independent variables and they determine 
how much the independent variables affect the dependent variable in this research. 
Time series data is considered to be affected by heteroscedasticity if the variance of 
the error term of an OLS is not constant. In the presence of heteroscedasticity in the 
time series, the standard error becomes biased, thereby affecting the confidence 
interval and the test statistics. Berry and Feldman (1985) indicate that minor 
heteroscedasticity may have little effect on significance tests. However, enormous 
heteroscedasticity can lead to serious misrepresentation of the research findings, 
thereby compromising the analysis and increasing the possibility of a Type I error. 
Manning and Mullahy (2001) indicate that transforming an equation into a natural log 
can reduce heteroscedasticity, and therefore equation three (4.3) is converted into a 
natural log as formulated below with the prime purpose of reducing 
heteroscedasticity. This method helps to estimate the variables in the same form and 
makes the interpretation of the results easy and simple. The natural log equation is 
specified as follows:  
lnGt = β0 + β1lnGESPt + β2lnGEEt + β3lnGEHt + β4lnTPt + β5lnTIWt + 
β6lnCEt + β7lnCITt + ℇt                     (4.3)  
 
The Ordinary Least Squares method alone would not yield the desired results; 
therefore, the research employed appropriate techniques to test the stationarity 
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property of the variables in the model. The DF-GLS and the Phillips-Perron (1988) 
unit root tests are employed to test the stationarity property of the variables in 
equation 4.3 above. The research used the ARDL approach to estimate the parameters 
in equation 4.3 above. The research also employed the bound test to test for 
cointegration and the Wald test to test for the significance of the variables. The 
research employed the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test, the Jarque-Bera 
normality test, the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity test (ARCH test and 
the normality test to assess the robustness of the model. The Granger causality test 
was also conducted to establish the causal relationship between the Gini coefficient 
and its explanatory variables.  
 
The variable to the left-hand side of the equation (G) is the dependent variable while 
the variables on the right-hand side of the equation (GESP, GEE, GEH, CE, TP, TIW 
and CIT) are the independent variables. The stochastic error term (ℇt) on the equation 
above represents the effects of the variables that were omitted from the equation, 
which are assumed to have a mean value of zero, and to be uncorrelated to the 
independent variables.  
 
 Data sources and research method  
This research used a quantitative research method using the dataset which comprises 
of 21 data points at a yearly frequency for all the variables. Data extrapolation was 
conducted by transforming annual frequencies to quarterly frequencies in E-views. 
Descriptive statistics are provided in appendix 2 of this paper. The transformation was 
conducted in E-views by selecting ‘Data Structure’ and select ‘quarterly’ to transform 
the frequencies from annual to quarterly data. The transformation of the frequencies 
was done in order to have the necessary number of frequencies required to conduct 
various ARDL tests and procedures. Secondary data was obtained and analysed to 
create new knowledge on the research topic. Data for tax on income and wealth, tax 
on products and tax on corporations was collected from NSA, National Accounts. 
Data on government expenditure on social pensions was obtained from various 
publications of the Bank of Namibia (Research Department), Ministry of Finance 
(MoF), Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Welfare and Ministry of Labour 
and Industrial Relations. To have a complete set of data for the desired time series, 
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some data were collected from the United Nations (United Nations Development 
Programme).  Data for the Gini coefficient was obtained from NSA (Namibia 
Household Income and Expenditure Surveys) while data for customs and excise duty 
was obtained from SACU annual reports. Data for government expenditure on 
education and health was obtained from the Bank of Namibia, Ministry of Education 
and Ministry of Health.  
 
 Qualities of a good model  
The quality of any empirical research depends heavily on the quality of the regression 
model adopted for the research. According to Osborne and Waters (2002), a 
regression model should meet certain requirements for the results of the research to be 
considered reliable and acceptable. Below is a brief summary of 
qualities/specifications for a good regression model.  
 
Firstly, the value of R-squared should be greater than or equal to 50 percent and the 
value of R-squared should be close to the value of adjusted R-squared. Secondly, 
most of the independent variables should be statistically significant in explaining the 
dependent variable. In simple terms, the P-value for most of the independent variables 
should be less than 5 percent. Thirdly, all the independent variables should be jointly 
significant to explain/estimate the dependent variable. In other words, the F-statistics 
should be less than 5 percent. Fourthly, the signs of the coefficients should be in line 
with economic theories. Lastly, there should not be serial correlation or 
autocorrelation in the residuals, which means that the residuals should be normally 
distributed. Given the nature and complexity of regression analysis, it is possible for a 
model to violate some of the requirements and still be a good model.  
 
 Measurement and expected signs/effects of variables 
4.5.1   Gini coefficient (G) 
 The Gini coefficient is described as a measure of income inequality that expresses the 
entire income distribution of a country into a single digit ranging between zero and 
one. The higher the number, the greater the degree of income inequality, and vice 
versa. The Gini coefficient is the internationally accepted measure of income 
distribution, and therefore, for the purposes of this research, the Gini coefficient is 
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used as a proxy for income distribution. As of 2018, the Gini coefficient for Namibia 
stands at 56 and this figure is relatively high as compared to the acceptable value. It is 
worth noting that the Gini coefficient estimate records at Namibia Statistics Agency 
(the custodian of official data in Namibia) is lower than the Gini coefficient estimates 
of international institutions such as UNDP.  
 
4.5.2   Government expenditure on social pensions (GESP) 
 According to the Bank of Namibia (2013), Social Pensions is a universal and 
unrestricted transfer of money to persons who are 60 years and older which is aimed 
at improving the social welfare of the recipients. The main qualifying criteria in 
Namibia are age (recipients must be 60 years or older) and citizenship (recipients 
should be Namibian citizens; or must have permanent residence; and should be living 
in Namibia). It is worth noting that social pensions in Namibia are extended to people 
with mental and/or physical disabilities. As of this year (2018), social pensions in 
Namibia stand at N$ 1200 per month. Government expenditure on social pensions is 
expected to have a balancing/positive effect on the Gini coefficient.  
 
4.5.3   Government expenditure on education 
Government expenditure on education represents state funding of education-related 
expenses. Government expenditure on education is expected to have a 
balancing/positive effect on the Gini coefficient. In the Namibian context, government 
expenditure represents state funding of universal free primary education, secondary 
education and subsidies to tertiary education including vocational institutions. 
Recently, the government also incorporated pre-primary education into its system. 
The government expenditure on the education component also includes the subsidy to 
private schools. During the period under review (1996 - 2016), government 
expenditure on education increased from N$ 1,199 million to N$ 15,821 million.  
 
4.5.4   Government expenditure on health  
Government expenditure on health refers to state funding for the provision of 
healthcare and healthcare-related activities. Government expenditure on health is 
executed through the Ministry of Health and Social Services which runs all state 
hospitals, clinics and health centres in the country. This expenditure includes the 
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personnel cost of health professionals, acquisition of drugs and medical equipment 
and the day-to-day running of all health facilities nationwide. Government 
expenditure on health is expected to have negative sign which imply that this variable 
is anticipated to have a balancing/positive effect on the Gini coefficient.  
 
4.5.5   Customs and excise duty    
Customs duties are charges that are payable when goods first enter the economic 
territory of any SACU Member State from outside the SACU. Excise duties are 
charges that are collected on specified goods that are produced and consumed in the 
SACU. It is worth noting that no excise duties are levied on specified goods that are 
exported to non-SACU countries. The excise duties are payable at factory gate and are 
not payable when the goods enter the economic territory of one member state from 
another. Duties collected by Member States are transferred into the Common Revenue 
Pool. Data for this component is obtained from SACU annual reports. Customs and 
excise duty is expected to have a worsening effect on the Gini coefficient.  
 
 
4.5.6   Tax on income and wealth (TIW) 
Tax on income in Namibia is referred to as personal income tax and it is applicable to 
the total taxable income of an individual whereby the employer withholds the tax. 
Personal income tax in Namibia is taxed at progressive rates over a series of income 
brackets. Individuals who earn an annual income of N$ 60 000 or less (N$ 5000 per 
month or less) do not pay tax in Namibia. Wealth tax is defined as a levy on the total 
value of personal assets which include real estate, assets in insurance, pension plans, 
bank deposits, personal trusts and financial securities. Data for this component is 
readily available from the national accounts stationed on the website of Namibia 
Statistics Agency. Unlike customs and excise duty, tax on income and worth is 
expected to have negative sign which imply that this variable is anticipated to have a 
balancing/positive effect on the Gini coefficient.  
 
4.5.7   Corporate income Tax (CIT) 
 Corporate tax is defined as a tax that is imposed by a jurisdiction on the income or 
capital of corporations. In Namibia, corporate income tax differs depending on the 
55 
 
type of corporation. Corporate income tax is expected to have a positive sign which 
imply that this variable is anticipated to have an unbalancing or worsening effect on 
the Gini coefficient.  
 
4.5.8   Tax on products (TP) 
Tax on products is the consumption tax placed on a product whenever value is added 
at each stage of the supply chain, from production to the point of sale. In economic 
theory, tax on products is proved to have an aggravating effect on income distribution 
because it charges a large percentage of poor people’s income as opposed to the rich 
people’s percentage of income. Tax on products is expected to have a worsening 
effect on the Gini coefficient. 
 
  Estimation methods/techniques  
Various tests were conducted in this research to estimate the relationship between 
income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) and the selected explanatory 
variables. The tests that were conducted include the stationarity test, diagnostic tests 
and the cointegration tests. The ARDL model was employed to estimate and assess 
the long-run and short-run relationship between the Gini coefficient and its 
explanatory variables in Namibia.  
 
4.6.1   Stationarity tests 
In time series data analysis, data is assumed to be stationary, meaning that the 
variance, the mean and autocorrelation remain constant over time. Time series data is 
said to be stationary when it has a flat looking series, with a constant autocorrelation 
structure over time, no trend, constant variance over time, and no periodic 
fluctuations. To determine the stationarity property of the data series, a sequence plot 
can be used.  According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (2018), 
if the time series dataset is not stationary, stationarity can be attained using the 
following methods:  
(i) The time series data can be differenced. The data can be differenced several 
times, however, first differencing is usually sufficient.  
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(ii) When the time series data has a trend, a curve can be fitted to the data and then 
model the residuals from the fitted curve. A straight line I is normally used 
with the view to removing the long-term trend.  
(iii) We can take the logarithm or square root of the time series dataset with the 
view to stabilising the variance. An appropriate constant can be added in case 
of negative data with the purpose of converting the entire dataset to positive 
before transforming the dataset.  
 
For the purposes of this research, the stationarity property of the variables is tested 
using the DF-GLS and the Phillip-Perron unit root tests, and differencing is employed 
to attain stationarity.  
 
4.6.1.1   Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Square (DF-GLS) 
The DF-GLS unit root test is a modified version of the Dickey-Fuller t test (D-F) 
proposed by Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996). It is similar to the Stata’s Dickey-
Fuller test; however, the time series is transformed through the Generalised Least 
Squares (GLS) regression before conducting the unit root test. Given a time series Y, 
the DF-GLS test can be expressed mathematically as follows:  
∆Y  =  ⍺ + 𝛽Y𝑡−1 + ℇ𝑡                   (4.4) 
Where ∆ represents the difference operator, ⍺ represents the constant, ℇ represents the 
error term. The coefficient 𝛽 is designed to account for the serial correlation in ℇt.  
This test provides an option on whether to include a constant and/or time trend. This 
test has proven to be superior to the previous versions of the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test (Elliott et al. 1996).  
 The null and alternative hypotheses are formulated as follows:  
H0: The series has a unit root 
H1: The series does not have a unit root 
 
4.6.1.2   Phillips-Perron Test 
Phillips and Perron (1988) came up with a non-parametric test for the null hypothesis 
of a unit root that explicitly allows for weak dependence and heterogeneity of the 
error term. The Phillips and Perron test is a modified version of the DF or ADF test; 
however, the t-ratio is modified so that the serial correlation does not affect the 
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asymptotic distribution of the test statistic. Given the time series X, the DF-GLS can 
be expressed mathematically as follows:  
∆X𝑡−1 = 𝛽0 + ⍺X𝑡−1 + ℇ𝑡                  (4.5) 
Where ∆ represents the difference operator, 𝛽0 represents the constant, ℇ𝑡 represents 
the error term. The coefficient 𝛿 is designed to account for the serial correlation in ℇt.  
This test provides an option on whether to include a constant and/or time trend. The 
null hypothesis of no unit root is tested against the alternative hypothesis which states 
that the series has a unit root. 
 
4.6.2   ARDL approach to Cointegration  
In econometric data analysis, cointegration tests are employed to identify the stability 
and the long-run relationship between variables. However, Rao (2007) indicates that 
if the cointegration test fails to find that relationship, this is not proof that such a 
relationship does not exist. There are various tests that are used for testing 
cointegration. The most popular tests are; Engle-Granger, Phillips-Ouliaris, F-bound 
and the Johansen-Juselius cointegration tests. The Engle-Granger method first 
constructs residuals based on the static regression. The ADF test is used to assess the 
residuals for the presence of unit roots. The Philips-Ouliaris is a residual-based unit 
root test of cointegration (Phillips and Ouliaris, 1990). This test is believed to be 
better than the Engle-Ganger test. This test takes supplementary variability into 
account. The Johansen-Juselius procedure is a cointegration test that allows for 
multiple cointegrating relationships. For the purpose of this study, the F-bound 
cointegration test was employed to test the presence of cointegration. The ARDL 
bounds testing approach is a cointegration method which was developed by Pesaran, 
Shin & Smith (2001) to test the presence of the long run relationship between the 
variables. This statistical method is relatively new, however, it has many advantages 
over the classical cointegration tests. The first superiority of the ARDL bound test is 
that it can be used irrespective of whether the series are I(0) or I(1). Secondly, 
unrestricted error correction model (ECM) can be derived from the ARDL bounds 
testing through a simple linear transformation. This model has both short and long run 
dynamics. Thirdly, the empirical results show that the approach is superior and 
provides consistent results for small sample. The cointegration relationship/long-run 
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relationship for the Gini coefficient equation is estimated using the ARDL bounds 
test, which is based on the standard ARDL model below:   
ΔlnGt = β0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖Δ
𝑚
𝑖=1 lnGt-i + ∑  
𝑛
𝑖=1 β2i ΔlnGESPt-i + ∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=1 3iΔlnGEEt-i 
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑖=1 4i ΔlnGEHt-i + ∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=𝑖 5i ΔlnTPt-i + ∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=𝑖 6i ΔlnTIWt-i +∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=𝑖 7i ΔlnCEt-i + 
∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑖=𝑖 8i ΔlnCITt-i  + β9ilnGt-i + β10i lnGESPt-i  + β11ilnGEEt-i + β12i lnGEHt-i + 
β13i lnTPt-i + β14i lnTIWt-i +β15i lnCEt-i + β16i lnCITt-i + ℇt              (4.6) 
Where Δ represents the first differences of the natural logarithms of the respective 
variables and ℇ represent the error term. The null hypothesis is tested by considering 
the unrestricted ECM for the Gini coefficient equation in (6) excluding the lagged 
variables lnGESP, lnGEE, lnGEH, lnTP, lnTIW, lnCE and lnCIT. The joint null and 
alternative hypotheses are:  
H0: β9=β10 =β11 =β12 =β13= β14 =β15 = β16 = 0 
H1:  β9 ≠ β10 ≠ β11 ≠β12 ≠ β13 ≠ β14 ≠ β15 ≠ β16 ≠ 0 
The first part (with differenced variables) of equation 6 above represent the short-run 
dynamics while the second part of the equation represent the long-run dynamics.  
Pesaran and Shin (1999) recommends the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
approach to cointegration or bound testing procedure for a long-run relationship, 
regardless of whether the underlying variables are I(0), I(1) or a combination of both. 
In such situation, the application of ARDL approach to cointegration provides 
realistic and efficient estimates. Unlike the Johansen-Juseliu cointegration procedure, 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration helps in 
identifying the cointegrating vector(s). The ARDL model operate in such a way that 
each of the underlying variables stands as a single long run relationship equation. The 
distributed lag model imply that there is an inclusion of unrestricted lag of the 
regressors in a regression function. This cointegration testing approach assists us to 
know whether the underlying variables in the model are cointegrated or not, given the 
endogenous variable.  
 
4.6.3 Long-run and short-run ARDL model expression  
The unrestricted Error Correction model is used to estimate the short-run dynamics 
between the variables. If the cointegration test indicates that the time series data is 
cointegrated, the cointegrating term which is also known as the error correction term 
(ECT) has to be estimated.  If  a  long  run  relationship between Gini coefficient and 
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the explanatory variables exists,  the  ARDL  representation  of  the equation  is  
formulated  as follows: 
lnGt = β0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 lnGt-i + ∑ + 
𝑛
𝑖=1 β2i lnGESPt-i  + ∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=1 3ilnGEEt-i 
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑖=1 4i lnGEHt-i + ∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=𝑖 5i lnTPt-i + ∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=𝑖 6i lnTIWt-i +∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=𝑖 7i lnCEt-i + 
∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑖=𝑖 8i lnCITt-I  + ℇt                  (4.7) 
The  ARDL  specification  of  short-run  dynamic parameters  are obtained by 
estimating the  ECM  version  of the  ARDL model in the following form: 
ΔlnGt = β0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 lnGt-i + ∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=1 2i ΔlnGESPt-i  + ∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=1 3iΔlnGEEt-i 
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑖=1 4i ΔlnGEHt-i + ∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=𝑖 5i ΔlnTPt-i + ∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=𝑖 6i ΔlnTIWt-i +∑ 𝛽
𝑛
𝑖=𝑖 7i ΔlnCEt-i + 
∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑖=𝑖 8i ΔlnCITt-i +ϒECMt-1 + ℇt                  (4.8)  
Δ represents the first differencing operator, G  is the Gini coefficient, GESP 
represents Government Expenditure on Social Pensions, GEE represents Government 
Expenditure on Education, GEH represents Government Expenditure on Health, TP 
represents Tax on Products, TIW represents Tax on Income and Wealth, CE 
represents Customs and Excise duties from the SACU, CIT represents Corporate 
Income Tax, ϒ represents the speed of adjustment which must be negative and 
significant, ECMt-1 is the lagged error term, t is the time period and ℇt  is the 
Stochastic error term. The constant is represented by β0 while β1 to β8 represents the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables, and they determine how much the 
explanatory variables influence the dependent variable. 
 
4.6.4   Diagnostic tests 
The  primary purpose of  regression  modelling  and  data analysis  is  to  formulate  a  
good  predictive  relationship between the dependent and independent variables. A 
regression model is estimated/formulated under the assumptions that the observations 
are statistically independently distributed, all the observations have the same variance, 
and the residuals are normally distributed. The residuals of these observations are also 
assumed to have the above-mentioned attributes. To summarise the above statements, 
the assumptions made about the estimation model are those of independence, stability 
and homoscedasticity. The model can be tested for goodness of fit by examining 
autocorrelation, Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET), 
heteroscedasticity and parameter stability associated with the estimated model. It 
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should be noted that a model can violate one of the assumptions and still be a good 
model. These examining tools are discussed in detail below. 
4.6.4.1 Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation can be defined as a mathematical representation of the similarity 
between a specified time series and a lagged version of itself over successive time 
intervals (John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2018). One of the 
assumptions of Classical Linear Regression Models (CLRM) is that the covariances 
and correlations between all disturbances are zero. Which means that the disturbances 
of a specified time series and the disturbances of its lagged version should be 
independently distributed. If this assumption is not met, then the time series is 
considered to be serially related. Autocorrelation is caused by various factors, some of 
which are explained here. One of the factors that can cause autocorrelation is the 
omission of statistically significant variables. A significant variable can be omitted 
either by mistake or on purpose. Secondly, autocorrelation can be caused by 
misspecification of the model, e.g. using a linear model instead of an exponential 
model. Lastly, autocorrelation can be caused by systematic errors in measurement. 
This normally happens when the institution responsible for providing data has over-
reported or under-reported. Autocorrelation can be in different stages, e.g. first-order, 
second-order, third order etc. The most common form of autocorrelation is the first 
order autocorrelation which occurs when the current observation of the error term is a 
function of the previous/lagged observation of the error term. Given a multiple 
regression model below:  
trtr XXXX  ++++++= ...3Y 443221t                    (4.9) 
In this case, first-order autocorrelation occurs when: 
ttt e+= −1                             (4.10) 
Where  is the first order autocorrelation coefficient and it takes a value between -1 
and +1. When  = 1, there is no autocorrelation.  
Second-order autocorrelation occurs when:  
tttt e++= −− 2211                 (4.11) 
The third autocorrelation occurs when:  
ttttt e+++= −−− 332211                  (4.12) 
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The n-th autocorrelation occurs when:  
tntntttt e+++++= −−−−  ... 332211             (4.13) 
Autocorrelation can be detected using a number of tests and procedures. The simplest 
method is the residual scatter plot where one can visually assess the presence of 
autocorrelation. Other tests for detecting autocorrelation include the Durbin-Watson 
test, the Breusch-Godfrey test, the Durbin’s h test and the Engle’s ARCH Test, among 
others. For the purposes of this research, the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM 
test will be conducted to detect autocorrelation.  
4.6.4.2 The Wald test 
The Wald test is one of the methods of testing the significance of exogenous variables 
in an econometric model. For each explanatory variable in the model there will be an 
associated parameter. According to Polit (1996) and Agresti (1990) the Wald test is 
used to test whether the parameters associated with an explanatory variable or a group 
of variables are zero. If the Wald test is significant for a specific explanatory variable, 
or for a group of explanatory variables, then we can conclude that the parameters 
associated with these variables are not zero, so that the variables should be included in 
the model. If the Wald test is insignificant, then we can conclude that those 
independent variables can be omitted from the model. The mathematical expression of 
the Wald test is given below:  
𝑊𝑇 =  
[?̂?−𝜃0]
2
1/𝐼𝑛(?̂?)
= 𝐼𝑛(𝜃)[𝜃 − 𝜃0]
2
              (4.14) 
Where:   𝜃 = Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) and  
  𝐼𝑛𝜃 = Expected Fisher information (evaluate at the MLE) 
4.6.4.3 Heteroscedasticity, structural stability and normality tests  
The presence of heteroscedasticity indicates that the error term does not have a 
constant variance. According to Austerio and Hall (2011), heteroscedasticity can be 
detected by conducting a number of tests such as the Glesjer LM test, the park LM 
test, the Breusch-Pagan LM Test, the ARCH test and the White test, among others. 
For the purposes of this research, the ARCH test is adopted because it is suitable for 
financial time series. Given an equation 4.14 below:  
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The ARCH test can be expressed as follows:  
tptttt vuuuu ++++= −−−
2
3
2
22
2
110
2 .....               (4.16) 
Where u represents the residual from the initial regression, 
2
t  represents the 
conditional variance of the error term, while p is the number of lags. The appropriate 
number of lags is determined by inbuilt Eviews lag selection feature. The study 
employed the Jarque-Bera (JB) test to assess whether the series is normally distributed 
or not. Normality of the residuals is an indication that there are no outliers and it is 
one of the assurances that the model is fit.  The study also employed the Regression 
Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) to test whether the model is correctly 
specified.  
 
4.6.5 Granger causality test 
The Granger causality test is a statistical approach which is employed to determine 
whether one time series is statistically significant in determining another. The Granger 
causality test was proposed by Granger (1969) in order to determine causality among 
variables. Granger indicated that in a two variable model, x and y, x is a cause of y if it 
is useful in predicting the value of y. For the purpose of this study, the Granger 
causality test was employed to assess the short-term causality between the Gini 
coefficient and the selected explanatory variables.  
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter provided a brief overview of the research methodology which was 
adopted, the sources of data for the research and a brief definition of the variables for 
this research.  The chapter also provided the theoretical and empirical model 
specifications and specified the estimation methods used for this research. The DF-
GSL and the Phillips-Perron tests are employed to test the stationarity property of the 
variables. The ARDL bounds test approach to cointegration is employed to assess the 
long-run relationship between the Gini coefficient and the selected explanatory 
variables. If the cointegration test reveals the presence of cointegration, the ECM will 
be estimated. The Wald test will be employed to test for the significance of the 
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explanatory variables. The Granger causality test will also be employed to assess the 
causality between the Gini coefficient and the selected explanatory variables.  
Robustness checks that will be conducted include the Regression Equation 
Specification Error Test, the normality test, the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation 
LM test, and the ARCH test. 
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CHAPTER 5: ECONOMETRIC DATA ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL 
FINDINGS  
 
 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents econometric data analysis and empirical findings of the research 
using the estimation model and techniques specified in Chapter 4. The chapter 
provides an interpretation of the empirical relationship between the dependent 
variable, namely, income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient and 
explanatory/independent variables, namely, government expenditure on social 
pensions, government expenditure on education, government expenditure on health, 
tax on income and wealth, tax on products, customs and excise receipts from the 
SACU and corporate income tax. The chapter comprises of three subsections. 
Subsection 1 presents the stationarity test results of the Dickey-Fuller Generalised 
Least Square (DF-GLS) and the Phillips-Perron tests, while subsection 2 presents the 
estimated Model. Subsection 3 presents the robustness test results and finally a brief 
conclusion of the chapter.    
 Stationarity test results 
The Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares (DF-GLS) and the Phillips-Perron Tests 
were employed to test the stationarity property of the variables, firstly, at level and 
secondly, at first difference. The null and alternative hypotheses for the stationarity 
tests are specified as follows:  
H0: The series has a unit root (non-stationary) 
H1: The series has no unit root (stationary) 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the absolute value of the test statistic is greater than 
the critical value in absolute terms. The Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares 
(DF-GLS) and the Phillips-Perron Test results are summarised in Table 5.1 below:  
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Table 5.1: Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares and the Phillips-Perron stationarity tests 
results 
Variable Model  DF-GLS Phillips-Perron Test 
(PP) 
Decision 
Levels First 
Difference 
Levels First 
Difference 
LNG Intercept 
Trend & Intercept 
-0.737 
-2.286 
-4.684*** 
-4.727*** 
-0.860 
-2.165 
-4.622*** 
-4.472** 
I(1)  
LNGESP Intercept 
Trend & Intercept 
0.684 
-3.022* 
-6.347*** 
-6.372*** 
-0.161 
-2.912 
-6.238*** 
-6.164*** 
I(1)  
LNGEE Intercept 
Trend & Intercept 
0.224 
-1.288 
-3.833*** 
-4.562*** 
0.621 
-1.164 
-4.287*** 
-4.750*** 
I(1)  
LNGEH Intercept 
Trend & Intercept 
-0.154 
-1.759 
-4.813*** 
-4.882*** 
0.050 
-1.783 
-4.672*** 
-4.624*** 
I(1)  
LNTIW Intercept 
Trend & Intercept 
-0.461 
-3.190* 
-4.082*** 
-4.943*** 
-4.894*** 
-2.970 
-6.591*** 
-9.817*** 
I(1)  
LNTP Intercept 
Trend & Intercept 
0.547 
-3.538** 
-8.222*** 
-8.596*** 
1.232 
-3.341* 
-9.209*** 
-24.062*** 
I(1)  
LNCE Intercept 
Trend & Intercept 
-0.232 
-3.898* 
-6.153*** 
-6.168*** 
-0.664 
-3.649* 
-9.473*** 
-8.091*** 
I(1)  
LNCIT Intercept 
Trend & Intercept  
0.261 
-5.489*** 
-0.449* 
-6.032*** 
-2.520 
-9.309** 
-11.189*** 
-10.343*** 
I(1)  
Source: Author’s compilation from Eviews output 
Notes:  (***), (**), (*) indicate 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance, 
respectively. I(1) indicate stationarity after first differencing.  
 
The stationarity test results based on the Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares 
(DF-GLS) method indicates that one variable is stationary at level at 1 percent, one 
other variable is stationary at 5 percent while three variables are stationary at 10 
percent. The DF-GLS test results further indicate that all the variables are stationary at 
1 percent after first differencing with intercept and trend. The Phillips-Perron 
stationarity test results indicates that two variables are stationary at level at 1 percent 
while two others are stationary at levels at 10 percent. The Phillips-Perron stationarity 
test results shows that all the variables are stationary after first differencing and they 
are integrated of the first order I(1). Based on the two test results (the Dickey-Fuller 
Generalised Least Squares (DF-GLS) and the Phillips-Perron stationarity test results) 
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collectively, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, and conclude that the data sets are 
non-stationary at level. The DF-GLS and the Phillips-Perron stationarity test results 
jointly indicate that the variables are stationary after first differencing. In the next 
section, the cointegration test is conducted to determine if there is a long-run 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables.   
 ARDL model estimation and cointegration test results  
The next step is to estimate the standard ARDL model from which we can derive the 
long-run equation to establish the long run relationship between the Gini coefficient 
and the selected explanatory variables. For the purposes of this research, we employed 
the ARDL Bounds test approach to establish the long-run relationship between the 
variables. If the cointegration test results indicate that the variables are cointegrated, 
the ECM will be estimated to establish the short-term dynamics. The ARDL in-
built/automatic lag selection criteria was employed to select the optimal number of 
lags for each variable. The optimal lags for the ARDL model are (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1). 
Table 5.2 below shows the results of the ARDL model.  
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Table 5.2: ARDL Model 
Dependent Variable: LN_G 
Method: ARDL 
Date: 05/14/19   Time: 17:13 
Sample (adjusted): 1996Q2 2016Q4 
Included observations: 83 after adjustments 
Maximum dependent lags: 4 (Automatic selection) 
Model selection method: Akaike info criterion (AIC) 
Dynamic regressors (4 lags, automatic): LN_GESP LN_GEE LN_GEH LN_TIW LN_TP LN_CE 
LN_CIT   
Fixed regressors: C 
Number of models evalulated: 312500 
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.* 
C1 LN_G(-1) 0.889481 0.048878 18.19792 0.0000 
C2 LN_GESP -0.131894 0.021309 -6.189532 0.0000 
C3 LN_GESP(-1) 0.105944 0.022771 4.652634 0.0000 
C4 LN_GEE -0.166086 0.039079 -4.250015 0.0001 
C5 LN_GEE(-1) 0.145905 0.035550 4.104216 0.0001 
C6 LN_GEH 0.014511 0.012155 1.193769 0.2367 
C7 LN_TIW -0.049179 0.023922 -2.055767 0.0436 
C8 LN_TP 0.146049 0.027267 5.356175 0.0000 
C9 LN_TP(-1) -0.121935 0.026709 -4.565376 0.0000 
C10 LN_CE 0.044029 0.016201 2.717755 0.0083 
C11 LN_CE(-1) -0.030385 0.016456 -1.846393 0.0691 
C12 LN_CIT 0.115921 0.021942 5.282986 0.0000 
C13 LN_CIT(-1) -0.076091 0.016348 -4.654494 0.0000 
C14 C 0.477109 0.231581 2.060221 0.0432 
R-squared 0.983482     Mean dependent var 4.138346 
Adjusted R-squared 0.980370     S.D. dependent var 0.080552 
S.E. of regression 0.011286     Akaike info criterion -5.977882 
Sum squared resid 0.008789     Schwarz criterion -5.569885 
Log likelihood 262.0821     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.813972 
F-statistic 316.0146     Durbin-Watson stat 2.076120 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Source: Author’s compilation from Eviews output 
 
The Wald test for coefficient significance is employed to test for the significance of 
the coefficients in the ARDL model above. The null and alternative hypotheses for the 
Wald test for coefficient significance are given below:  
𝐻0: Coefficients = 0 
𝐻1: Coefficients ≠ 0 
We reject the null hypothesis if the p-value of the F-statistic is less than or equal to 
0.05. The test is conducted in two categories, the first category consists of coefficients 
with the value less than 0.05 while the second category consists of coefficients with 
the p-value greater than 0.05 level of significance.  The Wald test results are given in 
table 5.3 and 5.4 below:  
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Table 5.3: Wald test results for significant coefficients 
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F-statistic  101.3089 (11, 69)  0.0000 
Chi-square  1114.398  11  0.0000 
Null Hypothesis: C(1)=0, C(2)=0, C(3)=0, C(4)=0, C(5)=0, C(7)=0, C(8)=0, C(9)=0, 
C(10)=0, C(12)=0, C(13)=0 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
C(1)  0.889481  0.048878 
C(2) -0.131894  0.021309 
C(3)  0.105944  0.022771 
C(4) -0.166086  0.039079 
C(5)  0.145905  0.035550 
C(7) -0.049179  0.023922 
C(8)  0.146049  0.027267 
C(9) -0.121935  0.026709 
C(10)  0.044029  0.016201 
C(12)  0.115921  0.021942 
C(13) -0.076091  0.016348 
Source: Author’s compilation from Eviews output 
 
Table 5.4: Wald test results for redundant variables  
Wald Test: 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F-statistic  2.171887 (2, 69)  0.1217 
Chi-square  4.343774  2  0.1140 
Null Hypothesis: C(6)=0, C(11)=0  
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
C(6)  0.014511  0.012155 
C(11) -0.030385  0.016456 
Source: Author’s compilation from Eviews output 
 
The Wald test results above confirms that C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C7, C8, C9, C10, C12 
and C13 are jointly statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance while C6 
and C11 are statistically insignificant or redundant variables. To confirm the strength 
of the ARDL model estimated, we can view the criteria graph which presents the best 
20 models evaluated using the Akaike information criteria. The criteria graph is 
presented figure 5.1 below:  
 
  
69 
 
Figure 5.1: Akaike Information Criteria graph  
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Akaike Information Criteria (top 20 models)
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Eviews output 
 
Based on the Akaike Information Criteria graph of the top 20 models above, we can 
observe that the selected model is superior compared to other models on the top 20 
list. Using the results of the ARDL model in table 5.2 above, we can derive the long 
run equation from the ARDL bounds testing through a simple linear transformation.  
The long run equation is presented in table 5.5 below:  
 
Table 5.5: Long run levels equation 
Long Run Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
LN_GESP -0.234804 0.119593 -1.963363 0.0536 
LN_GEE -0.182609 0.208150 -0.877295 0.3834 
LN_GEH 0.131297 0.124376 1.055645 0.2948 
LN_TIW -0.444983 0.241550 -1.842200 0.0697 
LN_TP 0.218184 0.195401 1.116600 0.2680 
LN_CE 0.123456 0.105027 1.175465 0.2438 
LN_CIT 0.360395 0.188926 1.907603 0.0606 
C 4.316989 0.716023 6.029125 0.0000 
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Long Run Coefficients 
Cointeq/ECT = LN_G - (-0.2348*LN_GESP  -0.1826*LN_GEE + 0.1313*LN_GEH -
0.4450*LN_TIW + 0.2182*LN_TP + 0.1235*LN_CE + 0.3604*LN_CIT + 4.3170 ) 
CointEq(-1) -0.101450 0.032098 -3.160652 0.0023 
Source: Author’s compilation from Eviews output 
 
The P-values associated with the long-run coefficients are all insignificant at 5 percent 
level of significance, therefore, we can conclude that there is no cointegration. To 
confirm the p-values of the long-run results above, we can conduct the ARDL bounds 
test. The bounds test results are presented in table 5.6 below:  
Table 5.6: F-Bounds test results 
ARDL Bounds Test 
Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist 
Test Statistic Value k 
F-statistic  1.046439 7 
Critical Value Bounds 
Significance I(0) Bound I(1) Bound 
10% 1.92 2.89 
5% 2.17 3.21 
2.5% 2.43 3.51 
1% 2.73 3.9 
Source: Author’s compilation from Eviews output 
 
The cointegration test results above confirms that all the variables do not have long-
run relationships at 5 percent level of significance, therefore, we cannot specify an 
error correction model.  
 ARDL short-run model and causality test   
The next step is to estimate the parsimonious ARDL model with differenced variables 
and conduct the short-run granger causality based on the t-statistics and the Wald F-
test. Five control variables, namely, GDP growth, population growth, inflation, 
corruption perception index and unemployment rate were included in the model, 
however, desired results could not be obtained. The automatic/build-in lag selection 
criteria was employed to select the optimal number of lags for each variable in the 
model. The results of the ARDL model with differenced variables are presented in 
table 5.7 below:  
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Table 5.7: ARDL model with differenced variables 
Dependent Variable: D(LN_G) 
Method: ARDL 
Maximum dependent lags: 4 (Automatic selection) 
 
Model selection method: Akaike info criterion (AIC) 
Dynamic regressors (4 lags, automatic): D(LN_GESP) D(LN_GEE) D(LN_GEH) D(LN_TIW) 
D(LN_TP) D(LN_CE) D(LN_CIT) 
Fixed regressors: C 
Number of models evalulated: 312500 
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.*   
D(LN_G(-1)) -0.005016 0.063385 -0.079139 0.9372 
D(LN_G(-2)) -0.005016 0.063385 -0.079139 0.9372 
D(LN_G(-3)) -0.005016 0.063385 -0.079139 0.9372 
D(LN_G(-4)) 0.427349*** 0.089109 4.795818 0.0000 
D(LN_GESP) -0.139709*** 0.018818 -7.424107 0.0000 
D(LN_GEE) -0.146113*** 0.044489 -3.284236 0.0016 
D(LN_GEH) -0.022352 0.024483 -0.912957 0.3645 
D(LN_TIW) -0.061108 0.046679 -1.309111 0.1950 
D(LN_TP) 0.232441*** 0.031974 7.269658 0.0000 
D(LN_CE) 0.044395*** 0.015637 2.839141 0.0060 
D(LN_CIT) 0.119209*** 0.028737 4.148300 0.0001 
C -0.000601 0.001373 -0.437300 0.6633 
R-squared 0.733304     Mean dependent var -0.002843 
Adjusted R-squared 0.689518     S.D. dependent var 0.018345 
S.E. of regression 0.010222     Akaike info criterion -6.189477 
Sum squared resid 0.007001     Schwarz criterion -5.829560 
Log likelihood 256.4843     Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.045283 
F-statistic 16.74746     Durbin-Watson stat 1.997336 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Source: Author’s compilation from Eviews output 
Notes:  (***), (**), (*) indicate 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
The short-run estimates in the table above reveals that Government expenditure on 
social pensions (GESP), government expenditure on education (GEE), tax on products 
(TP), corporate income tax (CIT) and customs and excise duties from SACU are 
statistically significant at 1 percent level of significance in the short-run. Government 
expenditure on health (GEH) and tax on income and wealth were found to be 
statistically insignificant. The research findings reveals that government expenditure 
on social pensions has a reducing effect on the Gini coefficient, and it is statistically 
significant at 1 percent with the P-Value of 0.0000. The coefficient of government 
expenditure on social pensions is -0.1397, which implies that a 1 percent increase in 
government expenditure on social pensions will lead to an improvement in income 
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distribution of 0.13 percent, ceteris paribus. This is in line with economic theory 
which stipulates that social transfers promote a fair distribution of income since it 
targets vulnerable members of society and boosts the purchasing power of people in 
the low income category such as elderly people, physically and mentally challenged 
individuals, as well as orphans in the case of Namibia. Samuelson (1955) indicates 
that all redistributions take place through transfer expenditure. A number of research 
findings have also indicated that social transfers have a positive impact on income 
distribution, e.g. the findings of an empirical research conducted by Vaalavuo (2013) 
indicate that government expenditure on social welfare such as cash benefit/social 
pensions have a balancing effect on income distribution. Keynes (1936) also insists on 
the need for the government to intervene to correct market failures such as income 
inequality, through various interventions which include the provision of social 
pensions.  
 
The coefficient of government expenditure on education is negative and significant. 
The P-value of government expenditure on education is 0.0016 and its coefficient is  
-0.14611, which implies that a 1 percent increase in government expenditure on 
education will lead to a reduction in the Gini coefficient by 0.15 percent, ceteris 
paribus. These results conform to economic theory, which suggests that government 
expenditure on education has a positive impact on income distribution as measured by 
the Gini coefficient. Samuelson (1955) highlighted the benefits and distributional 
effects of government expenditure on education. These results confirm the findings of 
the research conducted by Sylwester (2002) and Tsanos and Manos (1999), whose 
empirical research findings indicate that government expenditure on education has a 
balancing effect on income inequality. Another research by Martinez-Vasquez., et al. 
(2012) indicates that government expenditure on social welfare activities such as 
education services reduces income inequality. 
 
Tax on products has a worsening effect on the Gini coefficient. The worsening effect 
is indicated by the coefficient of tax on products, which is positive and significant at 1 
percent level of significance. Its P-value is 0.0000 while its coefficient is 0.2324 
which implies that an increase in tax on products by 1 percent will lead to an increase 
in Gini coefficient by 0.23 percent, ceteris paribus/holding all other variables 
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constant. The findings of an empirical research by Leu, et al., (2009) indicate that 
taxes have an unbalancing/regressive effect on income distribution.  These findings 
are in line with economic theories and with empirical research findings of various 
researchers such as Mylonidis and Losifidi (2017), whose findings indicate that 
consumption taxes such as VAT or tax on products have a negative impact on income 
distribution.  The negative impact of consumption taxes can be attributed to a number 
of factors, of which the key factors are summarised below:  
 
Firstly, taxes on products have a negative impact on income distribution because they 
charge low-income earners a large fraction of their income and high-income earners a 
small fraction of their income. This is because consumption taxes such as tax on 
products are regressive in nature; as a result, they negatively affect low-income 
earners severely as opposed to high income earners. Secondly, when there is an 
increase in consumption taxes, retailers and businesses would pass on the tax burden 
to consumers by increasing the prices of goods and services on which the tax is 
levied. Considering the fact that consumption taxes are regressive in nature, people in 
the low-income category will be worse off as opposed to those in the high-income 
category.   These results are confirmed by the research conducted by Martinez-
Vazquez, et al., (2012), whose findings indicate that consumption taxes have an 
unbalancing effect on income inequality.  
 
The research findings indicate that customs and excise duty has a worsening effect on 
the Gini coefficient, which is a similar trend in consumption taxes discussed earlier in 
this subsection. The coefficient of customs and excise duty is positive and statistically 
significant at 1 percent significance level. The P-value of customs and excise duty is 
0.0060 while its coefficient is 0.04439, which implies that an increase in customs and 
excise duty by 1 percent will lead to an increase in income inequality (Gini 
coefficient) by 0.04 percent, ceteris paribus. These results conform to economic 
theories and empirical findings, which suggest that consumption taxes are not 
effective in reducing income inequality. The findings of the research conducted by 
Mylonidis and Losifidi (2017) reveal that indirect taxes are not effective in reducing 
income inequality. Martinez-Vazquez, et al., (2012) also arrived at the same 
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conclusion that consumption taxes such as excise taxes and custom duties have an 
unbalancing effect on income inequality.    
 
The empirical findings of this research indicate that corporate income tax/tax on 
corporations is statistically significant at 1 percent and has a negative impact on 
income distribution with the P-value of 0.0001. These findings are in line with the 
findings of Leu, et al., (2009), whose research findings indicate that indirect taxes are 
regressive in nature, contributing to an increase in inequality and poverty. The 
coefficient of corporate income tax is 0.1192, which implies that a 1 percent increase 
in corporate income tax will lead to a 0.12 percent increase in the Gini coefficient. 
This is in line with general economic theories and with the empirical research findings 
of various researchers such as Mylonidis and Losifidi (2017), whose research findings 
indicate that indirect taxes are not effective in reducing income inequality. Increasing 
corporate income tax has a worsening effect on income distribution because 
corporations and businesses pass on the increment in corporate tax to employees and 
consumers through low salaries, poor service benefits and high prices of goods and 
services. This has a severe effect on employees in the low-income group and ordinary 
citizens at low-income category, thereby aggravating income inequality and poverty.  
 
The R-squared value is 0.733304, which implies that 73.33 percent of the variation in 
the Gini coefficient is explained by the explanatory variables under investigation, 
namely, government expenditure on education, government expenditure on health, 
customs and excise duty from the SACU, tax on products, tax on income and wealth, 
government expenditure on social pensions, and corporate income tax. The remaining 
26.67 percent is explained by the error term. The Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.9973, 
which is very close to 2, and this is an indication that there is no autocorrelation. The 
F-statistic is significant at 5 percent, which shows that the estimated short run ARDL 
model is robust.  
 
5.4.1 Granger causality and Diagnostic test results  
The study employed the Granger causality tests to assess the short-term causality 
between the Gini coefficient and the selected explanatory variables. The granger 
causality test rests are given in table 5.9 below:  
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Table 5.8: Granger causality test results 
Dependent 
variable 
SHORT RUN GRANGER CAUSALITY 
Tests Conclusion 
t-Statistics Wald F-Test 
D(LN_G) 
D(LN_GESP) Significant 
C(5)=0 
55.11736(0.0000) 
D(LN_GESP) Causes D(LN_G)  
D(LN_GEE) Significant 
C(6)=0 
10.78621(0.0016) 
D(LN_GEE) Causes D(LN_G) 
D(LN_GEH) Insignificant 
C(7)=0 
0.833491(0.3645) 
D(LN_GEH) does not cause 
D(LN_G 
D(LN_TIW) Insignificant 
C(8)=0 
1.713772 (0.1950) 
D(LN_TIW) does not cause 
D(LN_G) 
D(LN_TP) Significant 
C(9)=0 
52.84793(0.0000) 
D(LN_TP) Causes D(LN_G) 
D(LN_CE) Significant 
C(10)=0 
8.060723(0.0060) 
D(LN_CE) Causes D(LN_G) 
D(LN_CIT) Significant 
C(11)=0 
17.20839(0.0001) 
D(LN_CIT) Causes D(LN_G) 
Source: Author’s compilation from Eviews output 
 
The short run Granger causality tests indicate that there is a statistically significant 
causal relationship between the Gini coefficient and five of the seven explanatory 
variables, namely, government expenditure on social pensions, government 
expenditure on education, tax on products, customs and excise duties from SACU and  
tax on income and wealth. The short run Granger causality test results further indicate 
that government expenditure on health and tax on income and wealth do not have a 
significant causal relationship with the Gini coefficient. The Granger causality results 
using the two tests above are supporting each other which implies that the results 
obtained are valid and robust.  
 
Four diagnostic tests were conducted to assess the robustness of the estimated model. 
The robustness tests that were conducted are the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation 
LM test, the ARCH test for heteroscedasticity, the Ramsey Regression Equation 
Specification Error Test (RESET) and the test Jarque-Bera normality test. Three of 
the four diagnostic tests reveal that the estimated model is robust. Table 5.9 below 
demonstrate the outcome of the diagnostic tests:   
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Table 5.9: Diagnostic test results  
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test 
F-statistic: 0.000130 Prob. F: 0.9999 
Obs*R-squared: 0.000315 Prob. Chi-Square: 0.9998 
ARCH test results for heteroscedasticity 
F-statistic: 0.893661 Prob. F: 0.3475 
Obs*R-squared: 0.906519 Prob. Chi-Square: 0.3410 
Ramsey RESET test 
t-statistics Prob.  0.5436 
F-statistic Prob. 0.5567 
Jarque-Bera Normality Test results 
Jarque-Bera: 729.3972 Prob. 0.0000 
Source: Author’s compilation from Eviews output 
 
The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test result indicate that there is no serial 
correlation and the ARCH test results for heteroscedasticity indicate that the residuals 
are homoscedastic. The Ramsey RESET test reveals that the model is correctly 
specified. The residuals are not normally distributed and this can be attributed to data 
extrapolation. Based on the test results of the majority of the tests, we can confidently 
conclude that the model is robust and statistically acceptable.  
 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the econometric data analysis and empirical findings of the 
research, employing various tests and estimation techniques. The DF-GSL and the 
Phillips-Perron tests were employed to test the stationarity property of the variables. 
Both tests indicate that the variables are non-stationary at levels; however, all the tests 
indicate that all the variables are stationary after first differencing. The ARDL bounds 
test was employed to assess the long-run relationship between Gini coefficient and the 
selected explanatory variables. Since the cointegration test reveals that there is no 
cointegration, we could not specify the ECM. The short run ARDL estimates revealed 
that 5 explanatory variables are statistically significant while two variable were found 
to be statistically insignificant. The Granger causality tests indicates that there is a 
causal relationship between the Gini coefficient and 5 explanatory variables. 
Robustness checks were also conducted, such as the Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation LM test, the ARCH test, the Jarque-Bera Normality test and Ramsey 
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RESET test. Three out of four robustness tests indicates that the model is robust. 
Considering that 3 out of four tests indicates that the model is robust, we can 
confidently conclude that the model is robust and statistically acceptable. 
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CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Introduction  
This chapter presents a summary of the research and it consists of three subsections, 
namely, the summary of the research, summary of the empirical findings, conclusion 
and recommendation. The chapter concludes with discussion on the limitations of the 
research. 
 
 Summary of the research 
This research was initiated with the main objective to statistically analyse and 
interpret the impact of taxation and government expenditure components on income 
distribution in Namibia. The research is designed specifically for Namibia, because 
Namibia has one of the highest income inequality levels in Southern Africa, based on 
the World Bank categorization of income inequality. Other objectives of the research 
are to identify the gap in the literature by reviewing theoretical and empirical 
literature, to apply statistical tools to test the joint significance of the selected 
variables and to identify which independent variables have a balancing/positive effect 
and which variables have a negative effect on the Gini coefficient. The study aims to 
create new knowledge about the correlation between the dependent and independent 
variables and to have an in-depth understanding of the impact of taxation and 
government expenditure components on income distribution in Namibia. The research 
also aims to come up with research-based policy recommendations on how to improve 
the distribution of income in Namibia. The research tested three hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis is that corporate income tax, customs and excise duty from SACU (SACU 
receipts), tax on income and wealth, tax on products, government expenditure on 
social pensions, government expenditure on health, and government expenditure on 
education are jointly significant determinants of the Gini coefficient.  The second 
hypothesis is that corporate income tax, customs and excise duty (SACU receipts) and 
tax on products have an unbalancing or worsening effect on the Gini coefficient. The 
third and final hypothesis is that government expenditure on social pensions, 
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government expenditure on education, government expenditure on health, and tax on 
income and wealth have a positive or balancing effect on the Gini coefficient.   
 
Income inequality and taxation on a global perspective includes the work of authors 
such as McConnell and Brue (2002), who highlighted the causes of income inequality 
in the United States, and Nafziger (2006), who suggested strategies to reduce income 
inequality. Theoretical literature reviews include the Keynesian theory and the theory 
of public goods. Keynes believes that the capitalist system has some fatal weaknesses 
because it gives rise to unequal distribution of income and has undoubtedly failed to 
provide for full employment. On that basis, Keynes argues that the government should 
employ fiscal policy (taxation and government expenditure policies) to realise 
equitable distribution of income and full employment. Keynes strongly supports 
government involvement in the capitalist economy to correct market failures such as 
income inequality and unemployment. On the theory of public goods, Samuelson 
(1954) indicates that public goods are under-produced in the private sector, or may 
not be produced at all, following the conventional wisdom, so economic efficiency 
requires that the government force people to make a contribution (through taxation) 
towards the production of public goods and services and then allow all citizens to 
consume them. Efficient provision of public goods such as education consequently 
leads to reduction in income inequality because even citizens who cannot afford to 
pay for education and other public goods and services are afforded the opportunity to 
consume them. The theoretical literature reviews also included fundamental theories 
such as the Peacock-Wiseman hypothesis and the tax incidence theory, among others.  
 
Various empirical studies were reviewed, such as Leu, et al., (2009), Wittenberg 
(2017), Mylonidis and Losifidi (2017), Vaalavuo (2013) and Sylwester (2002), among 
others. The findings of a research by Leu, et al., (2009) indicate that government 
expenditures are more effectives in reducing income inequality as opposed to direct 
taxes. Social welfare expenditures were found to be more effective in redistributing 
national income as opposed to other government expenditures. Their research further 
indicate that indirect taxes have an unbalancing effect on the distribution of income. 
Sylwester (2002) indicates that government expenditure on education is statistically 
significant in influencing income inequality. This research has eight variables, 
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namely, the Gini coefficient (dependent variable), tax on products, tax on income and 
wealth, tax on corporations, customs and excise duty from the SACU, government 
expenditure on social pensions, government expenditure on education, and 
government expenditure on health. This research is a modified version of an empirical 
research conducted by Leu, et al., (2009) titled ‘Taxes, expenditures and income 
distribution in Switzerland’. 
 
Various econometric estimation techniques were used to establish the relationship 
between the Gini coefficient and the above-mentioned explanatory variables. The data 
was converted into a natural log and thereafter, the stationarity tests were conducted 
using the DF-GLS and the Fillips-Perron stationarity tests. The ARDL bounds test 
was employed to assess the long-run relationship between the Gini coefficient and the 
explanatory variables. Since the cointegration test revealed that there is no 
cointegration, we could not specify the ECM. Five control variables (GDP growth, 
population growth, inflation, corruption perception index and unemployment rate) 
were included in the model, however, desired results could not be obtained.   
Robustness tests that were conducted include the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation 
LM test, the ARCH test for heteroscedasticity, the Ramsey Regression Equation 
Specification Error Test (RESET) and the test Jarque-Bera normality test. Three out 
of four robustness tests indicated that the model is robust, therefore, we can accept the 
model based on the performance of the majority diagnostic test results.   
 
 Summary of empirical findings, conclusions and recommendations  
Below is a summary of the empirical findings of the research:  
a) The Dickey – Fuller Generalised Least Square and the Phillips-Perron stationarity 
test results jointly indicate that the variables are non-stationary at levels; however, 
all the variables became stationary after first differencing. 
b) The ARDL Bounds test results for cointegration reveal that there is no 
cointegration, therefore, there is no need to specify the ECM.  
c) The short run ARDL model was estimated and the results indicated that 5 
explanatory variables are statistically significant. The Wald test confirmed that 5 
explanatory variables are statistically significant while 2 explanatory variables are 
statistically insignificant.  
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d) The Granger causality test reveals that there is a causal relationship between Gini 
coefficient and the five of the explanatory variables.  
e) The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test results reveal that there is no 
serial correlation, which is an indication that the model is robust and acceptable.  
f) The ARCH test results indicate that there is no heteroscedasticity, which implies 
that the model is defensible and acceptable. 
g) The Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) indicates that 
the model is correctly specified and this is an indication that the estimated model 
is robust.  
h) The research reveals that government expenditure on social pensions has a 
reducing effect on the Gini coefficient and that it is statistically significant at 1 
percent, which suggests that an increase in government expenditure on social 
pensions will lead to a reduction in the Gini coefficient, representing an 
improvement in income distribution. Given this relationship, government should 
maintain/improve the current social pension scheme because of its contribution 
towards a fair distribution of income.  
i) The findings of this research indicate that government expenditure on education 
has an improvement or balancing effect on the Gini coefficient and it is 
statistically significant. This implies that an increase in government expenditure 
on education will lead to a reduction in income inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient. On that basis, the Namibian government should increase its 
expenditure on education; however, expenditure in the form of loans should be 
prioritised as opposed to grants and scholarships. Prioritising loans over grants 
and scholarships will ensure sustainability of the NSFAF in the long run because 
the funds will be revolving.  
j) The findings of this research reveal that tax on products, customs and excise duty 
from the SACU, and corporate income tax have an unbalancing effect on the Gini 
coefficient and that they are significant determinants of the Gini coefficient. An 
increase in any of the three taxes mentioned above will lead to an increase in 
income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. The research recommends 
a tax mix and tax discrimination where certain products are highly taxed, e.g. 
luxury products. With the tax mix, some taxes can be slightly reduced, e.g. 
corporate tax to attract investors, while other taxes should be increased, e.g. sin 
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tax (tax on alcohol and tobacco) to increase government revenue and discourage 
destructive habits. A tax mix and a hybrid of taxation and government expenditure 
components are strongly recommended to achieve a balance. Corporate companies 
should also be charged differently depending on the industries they operate and 
the nature of their operations.  This should however be done with caution to 
ensure that the country remain competitive to foreign and local investors.  
  
 Limitations of the research 
Considerable care was taken to ensure that this research is as acceptable and 
defensible as possible. However, a few challenges and limitations were experienced. 
The first limitation is the unavailability of national data for the years before 
independence. Data from 1990 and older is very limited or unavailable because there 
was no proper record due to the war in the country during that time. We should also 
take note that most of the institutions, e.g. Bank of Namibia and Namibia Statistics 
Agency, were established only after independence in 1990, which means that the 
records were unreliable or non-existent. As a result, the research used data from 1996 
– 2016. Due to limited data, data extrapolation was conducted by converting annual 
observations to quarterly observations in Eviews in order to be able to conduct a 
complete assessment.   The second limitation is that some explanatory variables were 
excluded because the data records available are very limited. Future studies can 
include some of the excluded variables such as transfer and stamp duties.   Further 
analysis might include a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach that 
could also be used with a panel of data in terms of SACU or SADC for future studies. 
 
Despite these limitations and challenges that might have an effect on the empirical 
findings of this research, it is assumed that these effects did not significantly affect the 
findings of the research. This assumption is backed by the fact that the results 
conform to theoretical and empirical literature and most diagnostic tests reveal that 
the estimated model is robust. On that basis, there is a very strong conviction that the 
results are credible and acceptable.     
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APPENDIX 1: ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE 
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APPENDIX 2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS    
 
 LN_G LN_GEE LN_GEH LN_GESP LN_TIW LN_TP LN_CE LN_CIT 
 Mean  4.139674  8.305938  7.662604  6.307995  8.709617  8.375947  8.529634  7.778043 
 Median  4.099332  8.152486  7.293018  6.378426  8.762333  8.326758  8.593019  7.898411 
 Maximum  4.249923  9.669093  8.885994  7.850493  9.867808  9.491375  9.758751  9.045702 
 Minimum  4.025352  7.089493  6.569481  4.804021  7.160846  7.395721  7.206378  6.059123 
 Std. Dev.  0.080986  0.767254  0.789905  0.867770  0.823593  0.627285  0.807287  0.864370 
 Skewness  0.478313  0.304179  0.266807  0.013587 -0.202515  0.194115  0.040193 -0.184847 
 Kurtosis  1.621074  1.873813  1.496793  2.033460  1.862110  1.849031  1.708753  1.998522 
 Jarque-Bera  9.857993  5.734388  8.905318  3.272280  5.105954  5.164084  5.858237  3.988711 
 Probability  0.007234  0.056858  0.011648  0.194730  0.077850  0.075619  0.053444  0.136101 
 Sum  347.7326  697.6988  643.6587  529.8716  731.6079  703.5795  716.4893  653.3556 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.544371  48.86031  51.78787  62.50100  56.29937  32.65934  54.09208  62.01226 
 Observations  84  84  84  84  84  84  84  84 
 
 
